




Title of Dissertation: GERMAN RADIO PROPAGANDA IN THE SOVIET 
UNION:  A WAR OF WORDS 
 
 Christopher J. Butsavage, Master of Arts, 2012 
 
Dissertation directed by: Professor Jeffrey Herf 
    Department of History 
 
The focus of this study is the content of Nazi radio propaganda to and 
concerning the Soviet Union.  The radio was a new and innovative means for the Nazi 
regime to directly communicate with the masses of illiterate civilians in the Soviet 
Union on a daily basis.  This study finds that as the war in the East progressed, there 
was an increasingly stark dichotomy between the positive messages found within 
German radio propaganda and the harsh reality of the Nazi occupation.  It seems 
almost as though there was a morbid inverse correlation between the amount of 
violence the Germans inflicted upon civilians (including forcibly sending them to 
work in Germany) and the amount of radio propaganda exhorting these same civilian 
populations to join the Nazi cause.  It is also important to note that every German 
radio broadcast to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union was not propaganda.  In fact, 
by 1943, a great deal of news items broadcast on German radio in occupied territory 
were administrative in nature.  Announcements such as local curfews, blackouts, 
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Joseph Goebbels, the Nazi Reich Minister of Propaganda anticipated the 
importance of telecommunications and the power it would hold between the 
government and the masses in his 1933 speech “The Radio as the Eighth Great 
Power” when he said that “future generations may conclude that the radio had as 
great an intellectual and spiritual impact on the masses as the printing press had 
before the beginning of the Reformation.”1  During the ensuing war between Nazi 
Germany and the Soviet Union, German propagandists used the radio in a concerted 
and sustained effort on a scale never before seen in history.  Through this new 
medium, they attempted to gain the support of occupied civilians and utilize it to 
more efficiently govern and administer those under their rule.  The ultimate goal of 
German propagandists in the Eastern territories was to administer the occupied 
population in such a way as to allow the Nazi regime to carry out their long term 
plans for the Soviet Union. 
While newspapers, leaflets and posters all played a major role in the German 
propaganda campaign in the East -- and I certainly consider them in my analysis -- 
the main focus of this study is the content of Nazi radio propaganda to and 
concerning the Soviet Union.  The radio was a new and innovative means for the Nazi 
regime to directly communicate with the masses of illiterate civilians in the Soviet 
Union on a daily basis.  Thus, the radio was not used merely for propaganda 
                                                        
1 Goebbels, Joseph. „Der Rundfunk als achte Großmacht,“ Signale der neuen Zeit. 25 ausgewählte 







purposes, but was employed as a brand new form of technology to administer 
populations under Nazi occupation. 
This study finds that as the war in the east progressed, there was an 
increasingly stark dichotomy between the positive messages found within German 
radio propaganda and the harsh reality of the Nazi occupation.  It seems almost as 
though there was a morbid inverse correlation between the amount of violence the 
Germans inflicted upon civilians (including forcibly sending them to work in 
Germany) and the amount of radio propaganda exhorting these same civilian 
populations to join the Nazi cause.2  It is also important to note that every German 
radio broadcast to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union was not propaganda.  In fact, 
by 1943, as I mentioned, a great deal of news items broadcast on German radio in 
occupied territory were administrative in nature.  Announcements such as local 
curfews, blackouts, conscription and mobilization decrees, and warnings were 
frequently broadcast.  
My analysis of Nazi radio propaganda also provides valuable insight into the 
priorities of the German occupation administration in the East by painting a 
chronological picture of the overall Nazi propaganda effort.  Within which themes 
and strategies changed significantly on a monthly and even daily basis all the while 
maintaining a constant overall appeal for the occupied populations to rally around the 
German cause in the face of ever increasing partisan activity.  On any given day, the 
tone and content of radio broadcasts or newspapers was most likely different in 
                                                        
2 It must be noted that many civilians in the borderlands between the German Reich and the Soviet 
Union originally greeted the invading Wehrmacht as a liberating force.  After years of oppression 






Warsaw when compared to Smolensk, indicating that German radio propagandists 
produced different broadcasts for peoples of varying ethnicity, nationality, and even 
religion.  Specifically, my analysis of German radio broadcasts from 1942-1944 
indicated the importance and intensity of the campaign to recruit civilians to work in 
the Reich. 
Due to the fact that there has been a relative lack of English (and even 
German language) scholarship focusing specifically on German radio propaganda to 
the East, my thesis does not significantly challenge the existing historiography 
concerning German propaganda in the Soviet Union.  What it does accomplish is to 
add a new chapter to this historiography, supplementing and strengthening it with an 
analysis of radio broadcasts specifically aimed at civilian populations in the east.  
Throughout my exhaustive study of secondary sources, I rarely found any 
work focusing on Nazi propaganda that had more than a few pages dedicated to 
German radio broadcasts in general, much less broadcasts specifically intended for 
the occupied Soviet Union (with the exception of Jeffery Herf’s “Nazi Propaganda to 
the Arab World” and Micheal Balfour’s “Propaganda at War”).3 
Concerning the entire German radio campaign in the East, when the 
staggering number of government bureaucracies that technically had some control 
over different aspects of propaganda in the East is considered, I found that while 
                                                        
3 Herf’s work clearly is focused on Arabic language Nazi propaganda, while Balfour’s focus is largely 
concerned with the propaganda war between England and Germany and Berlin’s broadcast’s to the 
world. Herf, Jeffrey.  “Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World.”  (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2009) and Balfour, Micheal.  “Propaganda in War 1939-1945: Organisations, Policies and Publics in 







fluid, geographically diverse, and at times contradictory, German radio propaganda to 
the Soviet Union was remarkably consistent.  Nazi propagandists identified the 
invading Germans both pragmatically and ideologically as liberators who presented a 
superior “European” alternative to Stalin and Communist rule.4  In this contention, I 
agree with Babbette Quinkert and her study on German propaganda in Belarus -- 
“Propaganda und Terror in Weissrussland 1941-1944: Die deutsche “geistige” 
Kriegsfuhrung gegen Zivilbevolkerung und Partisanen” -- that the German radio 
effort was not so much strictly ideological as it was inherently opportunistic.5   
While Nazi ideology and anti-Semitism were certainly major facets of the 
German propaganda campaign in the East, they were not the only subjects touched 
upon by Nazi propagandists, nor were they even the majority.  Though anti-Semitism 
and anti-Bolshevism were essentially inseparable in Nazi ideology -- I must concur 
with Daniel Uziel’s recent findings in “The Propaganda Warriors” -- the number of 
news items in which anti-Semitism or “The Jewish Question,” were dominant topics 
on German radio decreased in the occupied eastern territories after the first year of the 
war, only to occasionally reappear, most notably in the case of the Katyn Massacre.6  
My findings do not challenge Jeffrey Herf’s contention in “The Jewish Enemy,” that 
Nazi print and radio propaganda was highly ideological and virulently anti-Semitic.  
Herf’s book superbly documents and explores the vicious nature of German domestic 
                                                        
 
5 Quinkert, Babette. “Propaganda und Terror in Weißrußland 1941-1944: Die deutsche "geistige" 
Kriegsführung gegen Zivilbevölkerung und Partisanen. Krieg in der Geschichte” (Paderborn: 
Schöningh Paderborn, 2008.) 
6 Uziel, Daniel, “The Propaganda Warriors: The Wehrmacht and the Consolidation of the German 
Home Front.”  (Bern: Peter Lang, 2008), 286.  Uziel contends that the PK’s or Propaganda companies 
who were responsible for covering events in the occupied Soviet Union for the German press gradually 
reduced their reports concerning Jews to “zero” due to the fact that they had “more than enough 





propaganda, which is a completely different topic than foreign propaganda.  
Regardless, Herf’s finding regarding a worldwide, Jewish led conspiracy of 
Capitalists and Bolsheviks were consistent thematically with many of the radio 
broadcasts I analyzed, especially during the first year of the war. 
Though indirectly related to my study of German propaganda in the occupied 
Soviet Union, I owe a great deal to Manfred Messershmidt and Omer Bartov’s works 
regarding propaganda and the Wehrmacht, “Die Wehrmacht im NS-Staat” and 
“Hitler’s Army: Soldiers, Nazis and War in the Third Reich,” respectively.  
Messerschmidt’s work was the first to strongly argue that ideology played a major 
role within the Wehrmacht leading to further research on Propaganda Kompanies (as 
did Bartov’s), that played such a large role in the propaganda campaign in the East.7  
Peter Longerich must also be noted for his groundbreaking work “Propagandisten im 
Krieg,” concerning propaganda and the foreign ministry.  Most notably for my 
purposes he identified the key elements that made up the complicated organizational 
structure of Nazi propaganda in the Soviet Union.8  
The works of Aristotle Kallis, Peter Longerich and Michael Balfour were all 
critically important to my understanding of the vitally important power struggles at 
the RMVP, which often were decisive in determining the content of propaganda to 
the East. The feud between Reich Minister of Propaganda Goebbels and Reich Press 
Chief, Otto Dietrich, played out over the radio and due to their previous research 
                                                        
7 Messerschmidt, Manfred, “Die Wehrmacht im NS-Staat. Zeit der Indoktrination.”  (Hamburg, 
Schenk, 1969) and Bartov, Omer. “Hitler’s Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1992.) 
8 Longerich, Peter, “Propagandisten im Krieg: Die Presseabteilung des Auswirtigen Amtes unter 






concerning the nature of the feud, I was able to identify when Goebbels “realistic” 
propaganda approach was adopted and how this affected the German radio campaign 
in the Soviet Union. 
 I analyzed thousands of German radio broadcasts to the occupied Soviet 
Union as intercepted and deciphered by the United States Foreign Broadcasting 
Information Service, the OSS and the OWI, as well as the relevant secondary 
literature concerning German propaganda.  My study argues that regardless of 
Hitler’s brutal policies and the Nazi state’s complicated bureaucracy, German radio 
propaganda consistently attempted to recruit civilians under their administrative 
control to their cause by using a variety of ideological and pragmatic themes.  While 
Nazi ideology and anti-Semitism played a major part in the German propaganda 
campaign in the East, daily administrative concerns such as agriculture, food 
rationing, and the recruitment of foreign workers were often given priority over 







The Organization of German Propaganda During 
Operation Barbarossa  
Nazi Germany’s foreign propaganda apparatus was marked by constant inner- 
and inter-department squabbling that resulted from Hitler’s insistence upon 
delineating propaganda duties to multiple different bureaucratic organizations that in 
turn created competing power structures.  The German Foreign Ministry, the RMVP, 
the Wehrmacht, and the Department of Occupied Territories in the East were all to 
some degree in charge of propaganda duties in the occupied Soviet Union.9   
With 42 offices across Germany in 1941, including a Reich Foreign 
Propaganda Office, the Ministry of Propaganda had its own organizational structure 
within the bureaucratic structure of the German government.  However, even within 
the RMVP itself, there were serious divisions and active competition between the 
power structures built around Joseph Goebbels and Otto Dietrich.  
Hitler appointed Dietrich as Press Chief of the Nazi Party and was 
subsequently appointed as Press Chief of the Ministry of Propaganda.  Goebbels was 
nominally the head of the RMVP from 1933 on creating an awkward situation in 
which Dietrich was technically under Goebbels at the Propaganda Ministry, though 
they held the same rank in the Nazi party.10 As noted by Peter Longerich and Jeffrey 
Herf, it is particularly difficult to ascertain the amount of power that Dietrich actually 
yielded.  Because of his daily briefings with Hitler and his “great personal political 
                                                        
9 Longerich, Peter.  “Propagandisten im Krieg: Die Presseabteilung des Auswirtigen Amtes unter 






skills, his role in Nazi press policy seems larger than he wanted to admit after the 
war.”  Longerich logically concluded that both men played an important role in 
shaping Germany’s propaganda message and that their differences mainly “resulted 
from their different functions,” as Dietrich was responsible for day to day matters, 
while Goebbels focused more on long term overall propaganda strategy.11  
For Operation Barbarossa, the RMVP created an “Eastern Department,” that 
was located in Cracow.  The Cracow propaganda office incorporated Eberhart 
Taubert’s Anti-Comintern organization and its departments that consisted of an anti-
Jewish section, an anti-Bolshevik section and a Press section.  These departments 
collected, evaluated and translated materials that became the basis for leaflets, 
posters, brochures and pre-written radio broadcasts.12 Every German department 
involved with propaganda in the east was forced to liaison with the RMVP’s Cracow 
office. 
The German Foreign Ministry’s Department of Radio Policy 
(Rundfunkpolitische Abteilung) also shared responsibility for broadcasts to the 
occupied and unoccupied Soviet Union.13  The importance of the Russian division in 
the Department of Radio Policy was exemplified by its staff of 51 employees, by far 
the largest foreign language division in the Foreign Ministry, constituting nearly a 










Technically, most of the propaganda duties in the occupied Soviet Union were 
under the operational control of the field offices of the German Armed Forces 
Propaganda Branch (Wehrmachtpropaganda-Abteilung).15 The 
Wehrmachtpropaganda-Abteilung had been created in 1937 to coordinate the 
activities of the German Armed Forces with the Reich Ministry of Propaganda.16  In 
April 1941, a special section known as Section WPR IV was created within the staff 
of the Wehrmacht Propaganda Branch for work in the upcoming Russian campaign.  
This section trained special units known as Propagandakompanies or PK’s who were 
responsible for propaganda in the occupied territories.17  Goebbels and his Ministry of 
Propaganda played a major role in finding and vetting these men.18  
PK’s were purely military units consisting of officers and non-commissioned 
officers that were subordinate as army units to the command of their respective 
armies.19  Their personnel had expanded to about 15,000 men by mid-1942 and 
included professional journalists, radio reporters, photographers, movie camera 
operators, and interpreters.  Their mission as stated in the “directives for the operation 
of propaganda in “Case Barbarossa,” issued by the Wehrmacht Propaganda branch, 
prior to the start of the Russian campaign was as follows: 
The propaganda units are allowed to start producing all types of reports when 
the fighting against the USSR begins.  Atrocities and breaches of international 
law committed by the Red Army should be especially emphasized.  Reports 
based only on stories are unusable.  They should be based on official reports 
                                                        
15 Tyaglyy, 424. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Tyaglyy, 424. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Herzstein, Robert E., "Anti-Jewish Propaganda in the Orel Region of Great Russia, 1942–1943: The 





written by officers.  It is most important that the first reports about the fighting 
reach OKW as fast as possible. 
Forward propaganda liaison bases shall be established in Reichshof 
(Rzeszow), Warsaw, Konigsberg and Rovaniemi.  The delivery of the material 
from the units to the liaison bases in Berlin is the duty of the liaison units.  
Direct Army or Luftwaffe courier connections should be used whenever 
possible. 
Telephone connections shall be used, to the extent possible, for the delivery of 
press reports to Berlin.  In any case these reports must also be sent to Berlin in 
written form at the first opportunity.  Cracow, Warsaw, and Konigsberg shall 
be the relay stations for the radio reports (in other words the information that 
PK units sent to Berlin was then transmitted back to the occupied territories in 
the form of a polished radio broadcast).20 
 
PK’s were also subordinate to local Wehrmacht Propaganda Branches (WPr) 
of the Supreme Command of the German Army (OKW) that were organized along 
territorial lines.  For instance, in Robert Herzstein’s study “Anti-Jewish Propaganda 
in the Orel Region of Great Russia, 1942-1943,” the unit he examines in detail, 
PK693, collaborated extensively with the lc or “third general staff officer” of the 
army Oberkommando, but was subordinate to the Smolensk office “W” of the WPr.21  
The departments were further subdivided in 1942 into subunits (for instance, 
Propaganda Section “U” was responsible for implementing propaganda activity in 
occupied Ukraine).  By 1942, Propaganda Section “U” had been broken down into 
Section U1 in Zaporozhe, Section U2 in Simferopol, and so on).22  Each of these 
departments would then report their actions to Propaganda Section “U,” which sent 
monthly summaries to the Wehrmacht Propaganda-Abteilung in Berlin and Cracow.23  
                                                        
20 Ibid. 
21 Herzstein, 2-3. 
22 Tyaglyy, 424. 





In October 1939, German shortwave radio stations were beaming to foreign 
countries in 113 separate daily broadcasts from Zeesen, a suburb of Berlin, for 15 
hours a day, 7 days a week.24  The number of daily hours on air had increased to 22 
by January 1940, 31 by the summer of 1940, and 53 by January 1943.25  On 
November 14, 1942, the Federal Communications Commission’s Foreign Broadcast 
Intelligence Service reported that the Germans were broadcasting to the occupied and 
unoccupied Soviet Union on multiple frequencies.  Shortwave broadcasts were 
beamed from Berlin, while medium and longwave broadcasts were beamed from 
Baranowicze, Donau (Austria), Lwow, Madona (Latvia), Minsk, Smolensk, Vinnitsa, 
and Weichsel (Warsaw) for a total of over nine hours of programming daily in 
Georgian, Armenian, Azerbaidjani, Great Russian, Ukrainian, White Russian, 
Ruthenian, Transcaucasian, and Caucasian.26   
By May 28, 1943, the number of daily hours of German broadcasts to the 
Soviet Union had increased to nearly 14 and now included broadcasts in Tartar and 
Daghestani and even broadcasts in French and Spanish for Frenchmen and Spaniards 
fighting on the eastern front.27  The scope of the linguistic abilities of German radio 
clearly indicate that German propagandists had collaborators from most of the ethnic 
minority groups who called the western Soviet Union home at their disposal. 
                                                        
24 Herf, Jeffrey. “Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World.”  (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 
37. 
25Ibid. 
26 “Program Schedules of Foreign Broadcasts (Revised),” November 14, 1942, Program Schedules of 
Foreign Broadcasts: 1942-1947, Records of the United States Foreign Broadcasting Information 
Service, NARA, College Park, MD, RG262, Entry #51. 
27“Program Schedules of Foreign Broadcasts,” May 28, 1943, Program Schedules of Foreign 
Broadcasts: 1942-1947, Records of the United States Foreign Broadcasting Information Service, 






The Foreign Broadcast Information Service 
Meanwhile, by early 1941, the U.S. State Department had become seriously 
concerned about Nazi Germany’s intensifying foreign language propaganda 
campaign.28  In response, the Federal Broadcasting Monitoring Service (FBMS) was 
established on February 26, 1941, as a unit within the Federal Communications 
Commission and its mission was to monitor foreign radio broadcasts with a 
concentration on those emanating from Germany.29  By September of 1941, the 
FBMS was comprised of an Office of the Director, an Advisory Board, and seven 
separate sections:  Translation and Transcription, Report, Analysis, Monitoring, 
Engineering, Mail and Files, and Stenography.  Listening posts were originally 
established in Portland, Oregon; San Francisco, California; Kingsville, Texas; 
Santurce, Puerto Rico; and London, England.30   
On July 28, 1942, the FBMS changed its name to the Federal Broadcasting 
Information Service (FBIS) and by this time had established additional listening posts 
at Silver Hill, Maryland; Hawaii; and at several foreign locations.31  The FBIS now 
had the capability to monitor broadcasts from all over the world and its stated mission 
was to “intercept broadcasts of foreign news, intelligence, or propaganda emanating 
from authorized or clandestine transmitters in belligerent, occupied, and neutral 
                                                        
28 “Preliminary Inventories,” Records of the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, compiled by 









countries.”32  Recordings, transcripts, and translations were made at listening posts 
and then cabled or mailed to FBIS headquarters where they were edited.  Noteworthy 
material was teletyped to Government agencies concerned with “military, diplomatic, 
and propaganda aspects of the war.”33  The records of the FBIS were preserved and 
are now kept at the National Archives and Records Services Administration in 
College Park, Maryland.   
                                                        
32 Ibid. 
33 “Preliminary Inventories,” Records of the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, compiled by 








A War of Liberation 
German radio propagandists attempted to portray the battle against the Soviet 
Union as one of “liberation.” A circular from the OKW (the High Command of the 
German Army) made public shortly after the invasion was launched stated “the 
enemies of Germany are not the peoples of the Soviet Union, but exclusively the 
Jewish-Bolshevik Soviet government.”34  
Contrary to this public façade, the OKW issued its own internal instructions to 
Army commanders on the 19th of May entitled, “Guidelines For Behavior of Troops 
in Russia.”  Part of this OKW order states as follows:  
Bolshevism is the mortal enemy of the National Socialist German people.   
Germany’s fight is against this corrosive worldview and its bearers.  This fight 
requires ruthless and energetic measures against Bolshevik agitators, 
partisans, saboteurs, Jews, and the ruthless elimination of active or passive 
resistance.35 
  
What the Wehrmacht and the Nazi regime revealed to the occupied Soviet 
populace and the world regarding the rationale behind Operation Barbarossa was 
drastically different than what the Nazi regime and the German armed forces said 
internally.  As Omer Bartov argues in  “Hitler’s Army: Soldiers, Nazis and War in the 
Third Reich,” and made clear by the above OKW order, Wehrmacht soldiers were 
                                                        
34 Steinberg, Jonathan. "The Third Reich Reflected: German Civil Administration in the 






indoctrinated to believe that the war in the East was to be one of “annihilation” not 
“liberation.”36   
Echoing the ideological nature of the Wehrmacht’s internal propaganda, 
Colonel General Hoepner, Commander of Panzer Group 4 (who later died hanging by 
piano wire from a meat-hook for his part in the coup attempt of July 20, 1944) also 
saw the battle in the East not as one of liberation but as an “essential component of 
the German people’s struggle for existence.”37  On May 2, 1941, Hoepner wrote: 
The war against the Soviet Union is an essential component of the German 
people’s struggle for existence.  It is the old struggle of the Germans against 
the Slavs, the defense of European culture against the Muscovite-Asiatic 
flood, the warding off of Jewish Bolshevism.  This struggle must have as its 
aim the demolition of present Russia and must therefore be conducted with 
unprecedented severity.  Both the planning and execution of every battle must 
be dictated by an iron will to bring about a merciless, total annihilation of the 
enemy.  Particularly no mercy should be shown toward the carriers of the 
present Russian-Bolshevik system.38 
 
German propagandists in the East thus had to work in an extremely difficult 
environment.  Behind the frontline Wehrmacht divisions, units of SS, Gestapo, and 
Wehrmacht security units killed millions of innocent civilians.  Jurgen Forster found 
that the 707th Infantry Division, deployed in White Russia killed a remarkable 10,431 
“captives,” in one month out of a total of 10,940.  The division suffered only two 
dead and five wounded during this “combat.”39  The dichotomy between the German 
“liberation” propaganda and the reality of German conquest would only grow as the 
                                                        
36 Bartov, Omer. “Hitler’s Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich.”  (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1992) pp. 125-130. 
37 Forster, Jurgen. “Barbarossa Revisited: Strategy and Ideology in the East,” Jewish Social Studies, 
vol. 50 (Winter, 1988-Spring, 1992), pp. 23. 






war progressed and would force German propagandists to change their tactics, while 
remaining committed to their goal of recruiting collaborators to their cause. 
During the first few months of the war, the Germans largely focused their 
radio propaganda on justifying their invasion of the Soviet Union both pragmatically 
and ideologically as a “war of liberation.”  The FBIS did not decipher any German 
broadcasts specifically aimed at the East during the first few days after the invasion.  
Thus, I analyzed Nazi broadcasts to America and the World during this critical period 
as the theme of a United European, Anti-Bolshevik crusade was already apparent and 
would remain a cornerstone of Nazi propaganda until German forces were pushed 
west of the Bug River in 1944.  Thirty-six hours after launching Operation 
Barbarossa, Germany broke its silence and announced to the world that Nazi 
Germany was now officially in a state of war with the Soviet Union.  Berlin 
announced to the world in German at 8:00 p.m. EST on the 23rd of June that an 
ideologically driven war of liberation in the East had begun: 
This is the German Short Wave Transmitter, Berlin, with the News Service.  
  
On the 22nd of June, a (special) action was begun.  The German Army, in 
collaboration with allied forces, crossed the Soviet border in attack.  This 
battle in the East is the battle of Europe against Bolshevism…The Soviet 
Russian population has again been placed under terror and horror by the 
Moscow Government.  From reports coming from the Moscow Transmitter, it 
can be seen that even the least important incident will lead to the death 
penalty…The population in the Ukraine, (has) in general, refused to take up 
arms and support the Soviet system and attempts have been made in this 
region to liberate the political prisoners.40 
 
                                                        
40 DZD Berlin in German, June 23, 1941, “News in German,” Transcriptions of Foreign Broadcasts: 
1941-1946, Records of the United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service, NARA College Park, 






Less than 48 hours after the invasion was launched, the Germans were already 
using some of the dominant propaganda themes that they would attempt to inculcate 
into the occupied populations.  The main theme at this early stage of the war was that 
of a “United European Army” that came as liberators to free the Russian people from 
a detestable “Bolshevik” regime.41  It seems that this news report was also following 
Goebbels comment in his diary entry of June 5, 1941 to “sharply criticize Bolshevism 
and its inability in all areas of life,” as the report mentions both the refusal of 
Ukrainians to take up arms against the Germans and a reign of terror in Moscow.  
This implied that the Soviet government was not only unable to convince its citizens 
to fight the invader, but that it was unable to control its population without resorting 
to mass violence.   
The following day, June 24, 1941, another explanation was given by Berlin 
for the invasion of the Soviet Union, this time in an 8:45 a.m. broadcast specifically 
beamed to North America in English in a program known as “Letters to Harry.”  This 
highly detailed, precise explanation concerned why Germany was “forced” to attack 
the Soviet Union differed greatly in tone from the previous German bulletin 
addressed to the world on June 23 and echoed a theme German propagandists would 
return to after the battle of tide turned against Germany.  The broadcast did not 
present the war as one of liberation, but one of absolute necessity for the survival of 
the Reich in the face of the growing Bolshevik threat, “At this great moment in 
Western Civilization, German troops and their Rumanian and Finnish Allies are 
                                                        
41 An analysis of German radio reports from the first few months of the war clearly indicates that when 
Nazi broadcasters referred to a “United European Army” , they clearly  had in mind a “United Western 
European Army.”  Following their defeat at Stalingrad, the Germans would later include eastern 





pushing back the Red Army of Soviet Russia in the direction from which it came.  Let 
us together (examine) the causes of the conflict.”42 
The announcer then argued that Adolf Hitler, though a “natural foe of 
Russian Bolshevism,” had tried to preserve peace on the European continent by 
agreeing with the Soviet Union to a non-aggression pact and “further pledging (to 
not) exert any influence on the affairs of Poland, Latvia, Estonia, Bessarabia, and 
Russia” while also ceding eastern Poland to Stalin.  Following this agreement, Stalin 
repeatedly broke the original deal that Hitler “so kindly,” bestowed upon the Russians 
through their occupation of Lithuania, their invasion of Finland, and the military 
occupation of Estonia and Latvia.  All of these actions thus “made it evident every 
day that there was no stopping the Reds now that their appetites for neighboring lands 
had been whetted.”  At this juncture, Hitler again tried to ensure peace by allowing 
Stalin to seize the area of Rumania known as Bessarabia.  However, after a tense 
meeting with Molotov in Berlin -- it became clear to the German government that 
Russia was intending to resume its offensive in Finland and occupy Bulgaria 
militarily -- all after having had the “nerve” to request German permission to occupy 
certain military bases in the Dardanelles.  When Germany made it clear that they 
would resist such measures, anti-German sentiment among the Russian government 
greatly increased along with British-Soviet cooperation.  Germany was now 
                                                        
42 DZD Berlin in English, June 24, 1941, “Letters to Harry,” Transcription of Foreign Broadcasts: 
1941-1946, Records of the United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service, NARA College Park, 





completely encircled and with “Russian troop concentrations on the borders of the 
Reich,” Germany was left with little choice.43 
The comparative pragmatism of “Letters to Harry” is particularly remarkable 
when compared to another broadcast beamed from Berlin to North America five days 
later on June 29, 1941, at 9:00 p.m. EST in English.  This broadcast, entitled “Jane 
Anderson” and intended for American Catholics, portrayed the German invasion of 
the Soviet Union as an ideological and religious “ holy war of liberation,” or a 
“crusade” against Godless Communism. 
On last Sunday morning, (Adolf Hitler’s) battalions crossed the frontiers and 
demarcations of the leer of the Red Beast of Russia and forty-eight hours later 
in the clear of open day the consecrated folds of universal Catholic truth was 
delivered unto him in a message to the total diocese of the Catholic Church of 
Germany that her fifty million Catholics stand united and as one man, the 
German hierarchy glorifies the war against the Soviet Union as a battle on 
behalf of the entirety of (Catholicism) and assured the Fuehrer that the 
Catholic Church in Germany will support by word and deed the crusade 
against the Communist enemies of the Christian world.44 
 
The announcer, “Jane Anderson,” depicted Operation Barbarossa as a 
religious “crusade against the Communist enemies of the Christian world” and Hitler 
as almost a messianic figure, “fighting against Stalin and his foully slain twenty 
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million stands Adolf Hitler and a new social order.”45  This direct German appeal to 
Catholics was clearly aimed at building support amongst the American public for the 
Nazi cause to such an extent that they would reverse their interventionist course.  It is 
also interesting to note that it appears that in singling out Catholics, German 
propagandists may have been familiar with Father Charles Coughlin’s weekly radio 
show that was virulently anti-Semitic and anti-Bolshevik. It is possible that they 
believed his listeners would be the most sympathetic to their message as the “Jane 
Anderson” program was frequently full of bombast and anti-Semitic rants.46  
In the earliest days of the war, the Wehrmacht’s blitzkrieg attack was met with 
fantastic success.  By June 28, Minsk, one of the largest and most culturally important 
cities in the Soviet Union, had fallen and by the 30th, Army Group Center was a mere 
300 miles away from Moscow.47  By July 3, the traditionally conservative Head of the 
Army General Staff, Franz Halder, was confident enough to declare that “On the 
whole then, it may even be said that the objective to shatter the bulk of the Russian 
army this side of the Dvina and Dneiper has been accomplished.”48   
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By late August, the military situation had become increasingly desperate for 
Stalin’s Soviet Union.  The Baltic, Belorussia and most of the Ukraine were all in 
German hands; Leningrad had been completely cut off from its main sources of 
supply on the 21st of August.49  Voroshilov Zhdanov and Chairman of the City Soviet, 
Piotr Popkov informed the citizens of Leningrad that the enemy was closing in and 
might attempt to take the city by a letter published in the Leningradskaia Pravda on 
the same date.50 Simultaneously, a massive pincer attack led by Army Group South in 
coordination with Army Group Center’s 2nd Army in the Ukraine continued to 
achieve spectacular successes resulting in the encirclement of Timoshenko’s entire 
army in the Ukraine by mid-September.51 
Ahead of the advancing German troops of Army Groups Center and South, Radio 
Breslau beamed a broadcast entitled “Ukraine Under the Soviets” in the direction of 
what remained of “Soviet Ukraine” on September 12, 1941, at 3:22 p.m. EST in 
Ukrainian.  It encouraged civilians to welcome their “German saviors.  Have nothing 
to do with the Stalin dogs.  Come over to us.  Peasants of the Ukraine greet the 
German units as your saviors and listen to our broadcasts, transmitted from 
Breslau.”52 
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The broadcast sharply criticized the false promises of Stalin and Bolshevism 
and the horrible political, economic, and social conditions that prevailed in the Soviet 
Ukraine.  It also made vague implications of a better life under German rule -- yet 
still failed to lay out a clear vision concerning the future governing of Soviet 
territories under German control if the Nazis won the war -- would they be ruled by 
the Germans as colonies or would they be granted autonomy? 
Surely you have heard all the promises.  You have the right to live well.  You 
have the right to reside freely in the hotels; live in the concentration camps; 
and (of course) you have all the rights to participate in the digging of the 
Stalin canal.  You also have all the right to be happy when you walk 
barefooted and starve to death… (By Stalin’s order) the nation of the Ukraine 
became free.  (Speaker makes gutteral sneering sound).  Yes, of course you 
have rights -- a right to work like a slave and the right to die.  You have the 
right to operate a tractor, work like a slave, and deliver all you produce to the 
Soviet.  You, workers of the Ukraine, all that you got was tyranny and 
persecution.53 
 
During the middle of the broadcast, the announcer quickly changed tone, and 
directly threatened the “gangs of bandits…helping the Soviet Union” with death, 
clearly indicating that some type of partisan formations were already harassing the 
Wehrmacht by mid-September 1941:  
And you guerrillas must realize that you are a gang of bandits which the 
German Army will shoot on the spot when apprehended…The heroic German 
Army will crush once and for all the Soviet state.  Those who are helping the 
Soviet state will pay a full price for it.  We will have no mercy for them.54 
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At the same time, Army Group North under Field Marshal Von Leeb had not  
only surrounded Leningrad, but by mid-September was directly threatening the city 
itself.  The severity of the situation for Soviet forces was made painfully clear by the 
September 16 headline in Leningradskaia Pravda that screamed, “The Enemy is at 
the Gates! We Will Fight for Leningrad to the Last Beat of our Hearts!”55  During the 
previous week, Wehrmacht propaganda units set up loudspeakers in forward areas all 
along the Leningrad Front urging Soviet soldiers to surrender and defect.56  As a 
result of the continuously deteriorating military situation, the number of Soviet 
deserters rose from hundreds a week during the first few weeks of the war to 3,500 in 
a mere five days between the 13th and 17th of September 1941.57  
There is some evidence to suggest that citizens of Leningrad and potentially 
even  
Soviet soldiers were listening to broadcasts other than those of the Soviet Union.  
Despite Soviet propaganda depicting the Germans as fascist beasts who wanted to 
colonize the Slavic peoples, NKVD reports from the fall of 1941 indicate that many 
Leningraders were not particularly alarmed at the prospect of a German occupation.  
According to the NKVD reports it was “widely assumed that the city would fall, no 
European city had yet withstood the Wehrmacht.  The population was convinced the 
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occupiers would liquidate Jews and party personnel, but were divided over the rest of 
the population.”58  The reference to the “liquidation of Jews,” in particular, is 
interesting, as the Soviet press rarely singled out “Jews” as the victims of atrocities, 
but generally referred to such victims as “anti-fascists,” especially early in the war.59  
On the contrary, German news reports especially to the East contained clearly anti-
Semitic messages.  By December 20, 1941, the general ideological anti-Semitism 
found in German broadcasts during the first months of the war began to include 
reports of specific anti-Semitic measures that were taking place.  On the 20th, German 
controlled Radio Weichsel, broadcast to Poland in Polish the following message, “a 
new ghetto has been established at Radom to safeguard the Aryan population from 
the danger of diseases spread by Jews.”60 
The direct threat to Leningrad was lifted on October 2, when Adolf Hitler 
ordered his Fourth Panzer Army south to support Army Groups Center’s all out 
offensive on Moscow, Operation Typhoon.  In advance of and during this all out 
offensive, Germany continued to send shortwave broadcasts to Soviet Russia in 
Russian, but adhered to strict radio silence regarding “Typhoon,” until October 8 (at 
which point the Germans were confident their aims had been achieved).  German 
radio instead continued to devote time to what they considered to be the most 
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In a pragmatic appeal, Nazi broadcasters also stressed the dichotomy between the 
living conditions experienced by the general Soviet populace and that of the 
Communist party leadership.   
A Russian language broadcast sent on October 3, 1941, at 9:16 a.m. in the 
direction of Russia from Radio Weichsel (Warsaw) characterized the Moscow 
Conference as one with “noisy speeches and the clanking of wine glasses” but no real 
substance behind it.61  The announcer implied that while the majority of the Soviet 
population suffered the privations of war, the Soviet leadership in Moscow was still 
living a privileged life replete with banquets and wine.62  The broadcast disparaged 
the Conference, referring to its results as a “flat zero.”  “While Roosevelt and 
Churchill were well aware of the fact that Stalin’s chances for victory had long been 
lost,” they “did not want the world to know that they considered Stalin’s situation as 
hopeless” so as to prolong the war in the East as long as possible and gradually wear 
down Germany.  Introducing a new theme, German propagandists blamed Stalin and 
his British and American allies for prolonging the war and the suffering of Soviet 
civilians unnecessarily.63   
The announcer then abruptly changed the topic of discussion to address the 
question of private property, specifically “What is meant by private property in 
Germany?” The far higher living standards within the Reich were noted, vaguely 
implying that if Germany won and private property was allowed, such living 
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conditions would be possible in European Russia.  While the higher standard of living 
in Germany was stressed, the idea of private property was also reconciled with 
National Socialism and its allegedly anti-capitalist ethos.   
The anti-capitalism that Goebbels emphasized as a cornerstone of German 
propaganda in the occupied Soviet Union was also evident in the following appeal to 
the masses of Russian peasants forced to work on unpopular collective farms. 
In vain did the Soviet government destroy private property claiming it was a 
product of the capitalist system, whereas it failed to understand that ownership 
is the very basis of human nature which knows no classes, slaves and so forth. 
Doesn’t every one of you, in his innermost thoughts, including the most 
fanatical Marxists, dream of a little home, or at least an apartment, a motor 
car, a little business of your own?  There is nothing wrong in this, comrades. 
In National Socialist Germany, capitalism was destroyed, but private property, 
far from being abolished is further encouraged…Any employee or peasant 
may open his own business…Every employee, worker and peasant is able to 
own his own home and garden…The houses are nicely built and comfortably 
furnished.64 
The broadcaster signed off with ‘Attention! Attention! Toilers of the Soviet 
Union. You have been listening to our Russian language broadcast.  This is 
the Vistula-Warsaw radio station…’65 
 
German radio’s consistent critique of the alliance of British and American 
capitalism with Soviet communism closely matched historian Robert E. Herzstein’s 
findings in his article, Anti-Jewish Propaganda in the Orel Region:  1942-1943, 
which mainly examines German print publications in the Orel region of the Soviet 
Union.  Herzstein found that “OKW propagandists believed that the Russians were 
particularly vulnerable to an anti-capitalist, anti-Jewish line…while the Russian 
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peasant would respond well to attacks on American, British, and Jewish capitalism.”66  
This ideologically anti-capitalist theme was a major part of the German propaganda 
campaign until the Battle of Stalingrad.67 
The German drive on Moscow commenced on October 2nd with two of the 
largest battles of encirclement in the history of the world.   Field Marshal Ritter Von 
Bock’s Army Group Center had been reinforced by the 48th Panzer Corps from Army 
Group South and the entirety of Hoepner’s Panzergruppe from Army Group North 
and was poised for a massive breakthrough.68  Within three days, according to Heinz 
Guderian, Commander of the 4th Panzer Army, “a complete breakthrough (had) been 
effected.”  Guderian swung south, while Hoepner broke the Russian front in two in 
the center, and in the north Hoth wheeled his troops behind the Soviet forces 
achieving a complete encirclement.69  Over 500,000 Soviet troops were caught in the 
trap and the last major obstacle standing in the way of the German capture of 
Moscow appeared to have been removed.70 
In contrast to earlier German policy, as mentioned above, Hitler ordered a 
total press blackout on all information regarding the offensive until its success was 
“guaranteed.”71  Following the stunning German victories at Briansk and Vyazma, 
Hitler decided it was time to break the media silence regarding the new offensive on 
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called “the Great Watershed, that point in time before which all was rising and after 
which all fell, in the history of Hitler and National Socialism.”  Smith recalled the 
atmosphere and mood at the press conference held at the Reich Propaganda Ministry 
and headed by Reich Press Chief Otto Dietrich on the afternoon of October 9: 
On the great stage behind the central figure, Dietrich, the red velvet curtains 
were drawn apart to reveal a monstrous map of European Russia thrice as high 
as the speaker.  The effect was impressive…With an air of finality, Dietrich 
announced the very last remnants of the Red Army were locked in two steel 
German pockets before Moscow and were undergoing swift merciless 
annihilation.  This was sensational.  To understand how big the story was one 
must remember the circumstances.  This was the first substantial news about 
the mighty, new offensive.  It came directly from Adolf Hitler himself and 
could not be doubted.  Dietrich continued: behind the two pockets there stood 
between the German armies and Moscow just so much space and nothing 
more…Now nobody will contest the contention that the Nazis tell lies, and 
great big ones.  But it is true that Hitler himself has never told a lie about a 
specific military fact which can be checked.  There are two good reasons for 
this.  First, he does not have to lie about them; you don’t have to tell a lie 
when you’re winning.  Second, a specific military fact can be so easily 
checked, and if it were found out that the ‘Almighty’ had told a blunt untruth, 
especially about something so big as this particular event, it would be 
disastrous to his position.  So we of the fourth estate had no choice but to 
believe these dramatic assertions were gospel truth.  Behind (these) words 
there arose, in the minds of his listeners, inevitable images.  Russia, with her 
rich resources in Hitler’s hands: an increment of almost 200,000,000 units of 
slave labour to make implements of war, bringing the total of manpower at 
Germany’s disposal to a figure greater than that of England, and North 
America and South America combined.  Hitler’s armies, ten million men, 
flushed with victory, eager for more of the easy, national sport, were in the 
main free to return west and flood England, at long last, with blood and 
Nazis.72 
 
The same theme was emphasized on October 11, 1941, at 11:00 p.m. EST in 
the following broadcast beamed to North America from Berlin in German: 
Dear friends and countrymen!...With the smashing of Timoshenko’s armies, 
the campaign of the East is decided.  The Soviet Union is finished militarily.  







sort of defense.  How long they will be in a position to offer resistance is a 
question that we are not even prepared to answer today…But just as the Polish 
campaign was already decided on the 18th of September, 1939, and the 
breakthrough at the Seine resulted in the decision over France, likewise the 
history of the Soviet Army is sealed with the new destructive battles…All 
moral consequences of this suicidal decision (for the continuation of the 
fighting) (must be placed) on the rulers of the Kremlin.73 
 
This radio broadcast and Dietrich’s elaborate press conference conveyed the 
confidence the Germans had in ultimate victory at this time and continued to hammer 
on the theme that Stalin and a small (Jewish) clique around him were prolonging the 
war for their own personal gain (and that of American and British Jews) with no 
regard for the horrors the war was bringing to the Soviet population.  The new 
propaganda line absolved the Wehrmacht and Germany from the privations of war 
that the occupied populace was suffering and claimed that their hardships would 
cease if Stalin and the Soviet leadership would merely do the sensible thing and 
surrender to superior German forces.  This message was echoed in the occupied 
territories in an October 21, 1941, broadcast at 4:08 p.m. from Novgorod that was 
beamed toward the Ukraine in Ukrainian.  The program was called “Against Stalin” 
and the announcer calls Stalin a “bloody tyrant,” calling Russian resistance a “useless 
waste of life.”74 
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Reality Sets In 
 
As bombastic and optimistic as Nazi propaganda appears in retrospect, it 
certainly seemed within the realm of possibility in mid-October of 1941 that Moscow 
would fall before winter.  Pravda’s headline on October 14, 1941, reading “The 
Bloody Hitlerite Hordes are reaching for Moscow and (are) thrusting into the 
Donbass,” was certainly not reassuring news for Moscow’s civilian population.75  On 
the same day, General Hermann Hoth’s tanks broke through Moscow’s northern 
defenses and entered Kalinin sparking complete panic in the Soviet capital city.  The 
news that government offices were to be moved to Kuibyshev created mayhem in the 
city as distribution broke down and plundering began.76  On October 19, Moscow was 
officially declared to be under a state of siege and NKVD troops were brought in to 
restore order.77   
The panic in Moscow turned out to be premature.  Towards the end of 
October, the Russians were granted a reprieve as rain and snow, as well as the 
persistent thawing and refreezing of dirt roads, slowed the German advance to a 
crawl.  The weather also began to take a serious toll on the Army’s motorized 
vehicles, so critical to their blitzkrieg tactics.78  By the 27th of October, Goebbels was 
obliged to be the bearer of bad news (certainly not for the last time), and informed a 
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“somewhat startled press conference that weather conditions have entailed a 
temporary halt in the offensive (toward Moscow).”79  
Regardless of the worsening weather conditions and the deteriorating physical 
and mental condition of the German troops, most of whom had been fighting for 
months without any respite, Hitler demanded that one last attempt be made to take 
Moscow before the winter set in.  By the time the German offensive was underway in 
November, Soviet commander Marshal Zhukov’s defenses around Moscow had been 
doubled in strength by the transfer of divisions from Siberia.  Army Group Center 
began its final push towards Moscow on November 15.  German troops found the 
ground was “hard as a rock” which allowed their panzers to finally move freely once 
again.80  However, now that the Wehrmacht’s supply lines were stretched hundreds of 
miles, vital supplies such as oil were in short supply and the length of the front had 
almost doubled making it difficult to concentrate armor and force at any one point, 
just as the Red Army had been significantly reinforced.81  It soon became clear that 
this time the Germans had overreached.  On the 28th of November, Guderian 
expressed his frustrations with what had become of the Russian campaign: 
Only he who saw the endless expanse of Russian snow during this winter of 
our misery, and felt the icy wind that blew across it, burying in snow every 
object of his path; who drove for hour after hour through no man’s land only 
at last to find too thin shelter with insufficiently clothed, half starved men; and 
who also saw by contrast the well-fed, warmly clad and fresh Siberians, fully 
equipped for winter fighting; only a man who knew all that can truly judge the 
events which now occurred.82 
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On December 5, Zhukov threw his newly transferred Siberian divisions  
along with civilian volunteers (opelchenie) and the remains of shattered Army units 
against Army Group Center and broke the German encirclement of Moscow piece by 
piece, inflicting massive losses on the Germans and stopping them in their tracks.83 
Additionally, a further 130,000 cases of frostbite were reported amongst the men of 
Army Group Center.84 
The Battle of Moscow destroyed the myth of German invincibility (an  
important weapon for German propaganda during the first months of the war) and the 
Nazis suddenly seemed vulnerable.85  Earlier radio broadcasts from September and 
October (not to mention Dietrich’s lavish October 9th press conference) predicting the 
complete defeat of the Soviet Union now made the Germans look foolish in the face 
of the Moscow counterattack.  As such, Nazi radio propaganda was forced for the 
first time to drastically change its tone.  Testifying to this fact is a Christmas message 
the Germans beamed from Warsaw to the Soviet Union on December 25, 1941, at 
2:15 p.m. in Russian entitled “Nap in Russia.”  The once supremely confident 
German radio announcers in Warsaw no longer referred to great German military 
victories but instead reported on a speech by German Foreign Minister, Joachim Von 
Ribbentrop, in which he explained why the Germans were retreating before Moscow: 
If the Soviets intend with their last assembled forces to penetrate into 
territories so far cleared from Bolshevism, without any consideration to their 
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losses of men and supplies, then we Germans can only be happy about it.  In 
the nearest future, the German Army will finally solve the eastern problem.86 
 
Just two months prior, German radio reported that the eastern problem had 
been solved, now it was to be solved in the near future.  The Wehrmacht, just weeks 
before the invincible conquerors of Europe, was now bogged down before Moscow in 
the bitterly cold Russian winter wearing the same clothes they had gone to war with 
on June 22. 
On December 26, Allouis radio, broadcasting to the Reich, urgently asked 
housewives to donate wool goods intact, “Wool goods are easily unwound and knit 
into ear muffs, wrist and knee warmers, particularly appreciated by our soldiers.”87 
On January 18, Berlin radio broadcast what could be considered a desperate plea for 
“wooden cases” and “old newspapers” by a soldier from the front describing the cold 
in Russia:  “It is hard to get firewood because all wood is frozen.  We sleep on the 
ground covered with twigs and possibly with newspapers.  We lie close together but 
move as much as possible to keep ourselves warm.”88 
Additionally, for the first time, in a December 30 broadcast, Radio Berlin 
categorized the Wehrmacht as being engaged in a “defensive” battle before Moscow 
in which German infantrymen “have to stand in the biting cold for three or four hours 
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without being relieved” adding that “the army must hold out in its defensive fight 
against the Bolsheviks.”89  After six months of broadcasts reporting stunning German 
advances and guarantees of victory, Radio Berlin now had to admit that the mighty 
Wehrmacht was actually on the defensive. 
During the Battle for Moscow, the Soviets were able to take the initiative in 
the propaganda war for the first time.  Radio Moscow took full advantage of the 
desperate plight of the Germans outside of Moscow, littering reports from the front 
with descriptions of the Nazi soldiers in summer dress in the bitter cold Russian 
winter.  On December 10, 1941, a Soviet writer speaking over the shortwave radio on 
the southwestern front reported, “the warm clothing and good food of the Soviet 
forces are contrasted with the thin uniforms of the Germans and Italians.”90 
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The Failure of Ideology 
 
By mid-February of 1942, the once mighty Soviet counteroffensive before 
Moscow had completely lost its momentum.  The Wehrmacht had dug in and refused 
to retreat, inviting the Russians to make the same kind of suicidal frontal attacks that 
had cost them so dearly the previous fall.  German propaganda to occupied Russia 
during the spring of 1942 emphasized the fruitlessness of continuing Soviet 
counterattacks, and at the same time increasingly focused on the connection between 
Jewish capitalists in London, Washington, and Moscow “(who) will fight to the last 
Red Army man.”91  Additionally, now that the front had somewhat stabilized, 
German propagandists once again stressed that the war was one of “liberation,” as a 
quick victory still seemed within reach.  The FBIS monitoring station “Shinda” 
picked up a shortwave radio broadcast from Smolensk (the location of the radio wing 
of Wehrmacht Propaganda Office “W”) on February 20, 1942, in Russian at 12:15 
a.m. EWT that argued that Russian blood was being shed not for the Soviet Union, 
but for a small clique of overseas Jewish capitalists who had a financial interest in 
seeing the war in Russia continue.    
The rivers of blood which are being shed by the Red Army fighters do not 
make any difference to American capitalists.  They are perfectly ready to 
“fight” to the last drop of blood of the last Red Army man (sarcasm)…The 
terrible losses, do not stop the Soviet command, being faithful to their bosses, 
that is, the English and American capitalists, they will fight to the last Red 
Army man.92 
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Static prevents much of the broadcast from being heard, but when the 
broadcast once again becomes audible, the Russian announcer derided “Jewish rule of 
the world” and claimed that the “most influential co-workers of Roosevelt, such as 
the Jewish banker Baruch, Frankfurter, Neimann, and others (belonged to) Jewish 
Masonic organizations which have as their purpose Jewish rule of the world.”93 
The broadcast ends with a message of liberation and stressed the solidarity 
between German workers and those of the USSR:  “That ends our broadcast.  
Attention! All the workers of the Soviet Union, you were addressed by the workers of 
the regions which were liberated from Bolshevism and also the workers of 
Germany.”94 
Another German broadcast beamed from Smolensk in Great Russian 
intercepted by the FBIS’ “Shinda” monitoring station a month and a half later on 
April 7, 1942, used a different tact, but still emphasized the theme of liberation.  
German propagandists in Smolensk combined heavily satirical and sarcastic anti-
Semitic anecdotes criticizing Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill with liberation 
propaganda that vaguely promised a better life for the Russian peasant under German 
rule.  This particular broadcast was beamed from Smolensk on Easter Sunday and 
largely consisted of a satirical tale about “an old custom, to send eggs as a gift for 
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Easter.”95  Churchill received a “huge egg” which he was “at first glad to see,” but 
“(as) his empire was cracking on all sides and crumbling (so was the egg).”  Churchill 
was informed that the egg was an Australian soldier, but upon further inspection, he 
discovered that “(inside the egg) was a Jap!”  An assistant of Churchill’s then 
attempted to comfort him “be reasonable, how could this be possible,” to which 
Churchill replied: 
Impossible, oh yes, but all our defeats were impossible.  It was impossible to 
be chased out from Norway, Jugoslavia, and the Island of Crete.  It was 
impossible to lose Hong Kong, Singapore, Rangoon, Java, Bengal, Borneo, 
everything was impossible.  But nonetheless, everything was 
surrendered…Everywhere are Japanese, Japanese, Japanese.  In Australia 
there are Japanese too.  To arms-guards!  Help, help, HELP.96 
 
Roosevelt was also supposed to receive an egg which was to be provided by 
“the 
Jew LaGuardia.”  He never received it though because “the egg, among other things, 
was sunk by German submarines.”  Stalin, being an atheist naturally did not receive 
an egg in this broadcast but instead a present “wrapped in red” inscribed, “this is a red 
token from the Red Army.”  The present was in fact filled with blood of Red Army 
soldiers causing Stalin to “scream and call for help.”97 
The satirical anecdote highlighted the setbacks recently suffered by all of the 
major Allied powers and was indicative of the crude tone common to German 
propaganda in the Soviet Union.  It was followed by a bulletin announcing the end of 
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the collective farm system entitled, “A resolution drawn up by the peasants of the 
region of Podol citing the destruction of the collective farms in the districts liberated 
from the Soviet regime,” that again portrayed Hitler as a messianic figure and the 
Wehrmacht as the great liberators of the Soviet populace: 
(This) resolution is read by the peasant Jacob Nikolayevitch Polieshcuk:  
Attention! This announces the end of the collective farm method which has 
wrought so much havoc amongst the peasants.  The victorious German Army 
with Hitler at its head, have liberated the peasants from the Bolshevik yoke, 
which has been oppressing the peasantry, robbing them of the fruits of their 
labors.  Under Stalin, the peasant suffered hunger and other privations.  But 
now under the rule of the German army and the great Fuehrer, Hitler, there is 
no (longer) any collective rule.  A new life has started for the peasant with the 
expulsion of the Bolsheviks.98 
 
This broadcast followed the “passage” of the Agrarerlass on February 15, 
1942, a decree by Minister of the Occupied Eastern territories, Alfred Rosenburg, that 
declared an ‘end’ to the hated Kolkhoz or “collective farm.”  In reality, as noted by 
John Erickson in his article “Nazi Posters in Wartime Russia,” the decree was worth 
little more than the paper it was printed on.  The Nazi leadership had previously 
already declared the absolute need to keep the collective farm system in place as an 
efficient means of feeding the Wehrmacht.  Karel Berkhoff also concluded that the 
propaganda campaign surrounding the “abolition of collective farms,” was a complete 
failure.  Berkhoff notes that “village assemblies listened to special fifteen-minute 
radio broadcasts and heard that the hard-working peasant will get land of his own.”  
In reality, the “new” agricultural program was a return to “Soviet ‘labor days’, the 
notorious system of payments that took into account the time worked, the skill 
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involved, and the size of the harvest, and that ensured peasants received very little.”99 
German State Secretary Herbert Backe declared as much when he said, “if the Soviet 
regime had not set up collective farms, we (the Germans) would have had to invent 
them.”100 
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A Glance at Soviet Counter Propaganda 
The Russians rebutted the concerted and organized German propaganda effort 
by stressing the importance of the Soviet people in the war effort rather than the 
Communist Party or Soviet leadership (as was the case prior to the Summer of 1941) 
by publicizing the horrific deeds of the Germans in occupied territory while 
emphasizing the great military and moral superiority of the Soviet Union. 
In Russia, the war allowed the ordinary to suddenly become heroes or martyrs 
overnight as was the case with a young seventeen year old female partisan named 
Zoya Kosmodemanskaii who was said to have resisted fiercely when German 
authorities attempted to hang her.  She was reported to have given a fiery speech to 
the villagers gathered around promising Soviet retribution for German authorities as 
she was led to the gallows.  When her story was published in an issue of Pravda in 
January of 1942 -- her name quickly became known throughout the Soviet Union 
overnight -- she was forever associated with the Russian resistance.101    
The heroism of the average Soviet citizen was also stressed in a March 16, 
1942, Soviet Information Bureau Report, “The names of many of the heroes are 
unknown.  People who perform exploits stand humbly aside.  This is the way a 
kolkhoz woman from the village of N. Starousski district acted…Risking her life, the 
kolkhoz woman ran across a field strafed with fire from both sides and gave 
information to the commander.”102  Such stories were valuable as they inspired and 
raised the morale of the populace, which at the same time providing soldiers at the 
                                                        






front with greater incentive to fight.  Surely any soldier at the front was as brave as a 
poor, old kolkhoz woman or as a seventeen-year old girl.   
To maximize the morale of the civilian populace in the Soviet Union, it was 
vital that they were aware of the desperation of their situation.  The method in which 
Soviet propaganda instilled this concept unto civilians was to describe the choice the 
Soviet populace had as a simple one, either enslavement or freedom.  As early as July 
17, 1941, Pravda characterized Hitler’s view towards the East with the following 
description: “His most vicious hatred is and was nourished by the racist monster 
Hitler for the Slavic peoples…In the opinion of this fiend, the lowest of all races is 
Slavic.”103 
The most consistent Soviet counter-propaganda effort throughout the war was 
publicizing German atrocities.  This effort was highly successful in inciting hatred 
and anger towards the German invaders according to James von Geldern in Culture 
and Entertainment in Wartime Russia.104  Von Geldren also cites the Spring of 1942 
as the date in which Soviet propagandists first began publicizing German atrocities 
against civilians.  According to Russian radio broadcasts intercepted by the Foreign 
Broadcast Information Service, the Soviet campaign against German atrocities in fact 
began within the first few weeks of the war.  On September 26, 1941, FBIS 
summarized Radio Moscow’s recent broadcasts: 
Moscow still speaks of the extreme misfortune of the people living in 
German-occupied territories.  Also continuing its heavy barrage of atrocity 
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stories, the Soviet radio says the ‘enslaved’ people are used by the Germans as 
beasts of burden, and illustrates charges of German brutality with a typical 
story describing the murder of a Russian baby.105 
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German Military Superiority? 
 
The summer military campaign season began with nearly unmitigated disaster 
for the Red Army in the southern sector of the front.  During the spring of 1942, 
Army Group South deployed a large number of aircraft to the Kerch peninsula to 
interdict the ability of the Soviets to re-supply their foothold on the peninsula.  The 
Luftwaffe quickly established air superiority by the beginning of May cutting the 
Soviets’ supply lines to their three armies on the Kerch Peninsula. 106  
In April, the Stavka had asked Stalin for permission to withdraw from the 
Kerch region.  Characteristically, he refused and instead ordered preparations for an 
offensive to liberate the entire Crimea on April 21.  On May 6, Stalin abruptly 
changed his mind and now ordered the Kerch divisions to go over to the defensive in 
combination with a limited offensive.107  These contradictory and divergent orders 
from Stalin of course led to much confusion and ultimately left the Soviet forces on 
Kerch woefully unprepared in the face of an inevitable German offensive by the 
Wehrmacht’s 11th Army under General (and later Field Marshal) Erich von Manstein. 
Manstein did not waste any time.  On May 8, German forces launched 
Operation Trappenjagd with the aim of eliminating the Soviet bridgehead near 
Kerch.  By May 18, German forces with strong air support had captured three entire 








Sevastopol on July 4.108  Most importantly, Army Group South’s southern flank was 
now secure allowing Hitler to launch Operation Fall Blau, the massive German 
summer offensive that the Fuhrer and OKH had been planning since February.  
In advance of the launch of Fall Blau in late June 1942, the FBIS “Shinda” 
station intercepted an increasing number of German broadcasts to unoccupied and 
occupied portions of the southern Soviet Union beamed from the vicinity of 
Voroshilov, Russia on June 16-20, 1942.  Unlike all of the other FBIS transcriptions, 
the Voroshilov radio broadcasts were summarized instead of being transcribed 
precisely.  The broadcasts, however, still provided a snapshot into the themes and 
narratives of German radio propaganda in Russia during June of 1942, when the 
Wehrmacht was arguably at its “high tide” and most confident, prior to the stunning 
setbacks that would come to define the Nazi military effort over the next year (and 
beyond).  Over this four-day span, German radio hammered away at the themes they 
had established during the first year of war which were remarkably similar to those 
that Goebbels jotted down in his diary in early June of 1941, all the while continuing 
to portray the war as one of “liberation.”  
The broadcasts focused on four major themes:  the military superiority of the 
German armed forces and the enormous losses that the Red Army continued to suffer; 
the instability of the Bolshevik regime “in all areas of life”; the fruitless continuation 
of the war by Stalin and a small Jewish clique around him; and the complete 
denunciation of the Soviet-British-American treaty and any potential lend lease aid 







and for the Russian people…fighting against the Jewish-Stalinist domination of 
enslaved Russian peoples, against collective farms and for a free liberated Russian 
nation.”  (Interestingly, this is the only time I found any mention of a “free, liberated 
Russian nation” in any form of German propaganda to the occupied U.S.S.R.)  The 
approach of the broadcasts was to essentially combine a certain amount of Nazi 
ideology with more pragmatic themes such as food supply and German military 
superiority that would seem to resonate to a greater extent with rural peasants. 
Concerning the military superiority of the Wehrmacht and the hopeless 
situation of the Red Army, Voroshilov Radio reported on June 16 that the 
“Sevastopol Front is strewn with the corpses,” while on the Kharkov Front “there are 
many cases of Russian fighters shooting themselves not being able to face hardships 
(at the front) again.”109  On the 17th, it was broadcast: “as predicted by this station 
several days ago, the Germans are bound to take Sevastopol.  Their successes there 
continue and Russians are giving up one fortified point after another.”110   
In the face of such German superiority, Voroshilov radio announced the 
following on June 19: “Stalin was deliberately shedding the blood of the Russian 
people by not allowing Sevastopol and Leningrad to surrender regardless of 
enormous, bloody losses.”  The announcer further encouraged peasants and workers 
to rise up against Stalin and argued that “only Stalin and the small clique around him 
keep Russia in misery, and (that) Russia would be a free and happy country if this 
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clique were overthrown…It’s up to (the) exploited and impoverished workers and 
peasants to get rid of Stalin and company.”111  Further indicting Stalin’s continuation 
of the war, Voroshilov quoted Erich Remarque’s classic All Quiet on the Western 
Front as the “speaker voices bitter indignation about the Russian attitude in their 
(official military communiqués)” and adds that “while millions of Russians (are) 
dying on the battlefield, (the) Russians have the temerity to say there are no 
significant changes along (the) entire front.”112 
Voroshilov Radio further attempted to undermine Stalin and his Bolshevik 
government by reporting on instability within the Soviet regime and its territories.  
On June 16, German radio broadcast: “reports from (the state of) Omsk (indicate) the 
situation there is very bad, many uprisings (are taking place) among wives of workers 
due to poor rations.  Many executions are taking place.”113  While on June 17, it was 
reported that “women in Krasnodar protested against the war” while “economic chaos 
in Soviet life is becoming worse and worse.  The industrial and economic life of the 
country is out of gear.”114    
When Hitler launched Operation Fall Blau, on June 28, 1942, it must have 
been difficult to imagine it would end with perhaps the largest and most important 
propaganda (and military) defeat of the war for the Nazis.  But, German propaganda 
                                                        
111 Radio Voroshilov in Great Russian, June 19, 1942, United States Foreign Broadcast Information 
Service. Transcriptions of Foreign Broadcasts 1941-1946, Records of the United States Foreign 
Broadcasting Information Service, NARA, College Park, MD, RG262, Entry #3. 
112 Radio Voroshilov in Great Russian, June 16, 1942, United States Foreign Broadcast Information 
Service. Transcriptions of Foreign Broadcasts 1941-1946, Records of the United States Foreign 
Broadcasting Information Service, NARA, College Park, MD, RG262, Entry #3. 
113 Radio Voroshilov in Great Russian, June 16, 1942, United States Foreign Broadcast Information 
Service. Transcriptions of Foreign Broadcasts 1941-1946, Records of the United States Foreign 
Broadcasting Information Service, NARA, College Park, MD, RG262, Entry #3. 
114 Radio Voroshilov in Great Russian, June 17, 1942, United States Foreign Broadcast Information 
Service. Transcriptions of Foreign Broadcasts 1941-1946, Records of the United States Foreign 





had been largely undermined by the time the Sixth Army surrendered on January 31, 
1943, and would never be able to regain whatever semblance of credibility it had 
enjoyed prior to the Wehrmacht’s crushing defeat at Stalingrad. 
The German offensive consisted of a three-pronged attack across Russia’s 
southern steppes.  Hermann Hoth’s Fourth Panzer Army reinforced by the German 
Second Army was to attack from Kursk to Voronezh, anchoring the northern flank of 
the Sixth Army’s drive toward the Volga.115  The aforementioned German Sixth 
Army under the command of General Friedrich Von Paulus was ordered to rapidly 
strike east and reach the Volga at Stalingrad (although the German High Command 
originally did not view the capture of the city as necessary to the success of the 
operation).  The German First Panzer Army was to simultaneously drive toward the 
Lower Don, protected by the Seventeenth Army on its western flank and the Fourth 
Romanian Army on its eastern flank, en route to Grozny and the Black Sea port of 
Baku.  The overriding strategic goal of the operation was to seize the Soviet oil fields 
at Maikop, Baku, and Grozny that were essential to further German military 
operations.116 
When the offensive finally commenced on June 28, 1942, Stalin along with 
the majority of the Red Army leadership were caught completely off guard.  Lacking 
in intelligence, the Stavka was unable to determine the aims of the inevitable German 
summer offensive.  Stalin, however, strongly believed that the Nazi attack would be 
on the Moscow axis and positioned his forces accordingly.  In June of 1942, much of 
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the Red Army’s best troops and equipment were concentrated in the central sector of 
the front.117 
On the 28th, Hoth’s Fourth Panzer Army quickly struck out toward Voronezh 
as the Red Army fell back toward the city in complete disarray.  Vorenezh fell on 
July 13, but not after several days of bitter house-to-house fighting that caused Hitler 
to completely alter the entire operational plan of Fall Blau in Fuhrer Directive No. 
45. Hitler’s ambitious new directive instructed Army Group South be split into Army 
Groups A and B.  Army Group A was tasked with taking the Caucasus and the oil 
fields along the Black Sea, while newly formed Army Group B was ordered to 
simultaneously attempt to take Stalingrad and cut off the Volga River, a vital source 
of supply for the Southern Russian steppe.118 
By the end of July, the German offensive appeared nearly unstoppable and 
Nazi propaganda began to reflect this.  On July 23, Army Group A recaptured Rostov 
and forced a crossing of the Don, the last obstacle standing between German troops 
and the Caucasus.  By this time, the division that had been brewing since the Summer 
of 1941 (and before) between Goebbels wish for a more cautious propaganda line in 
light of the disasters of the previous winter (and the dangers of overconfidence) on 
one hand and Dietrich’s more optimistic stance (with the support of Hitler 
temporarily) was coming to a head.  Deitrich desired to continue the “triumphalist” 
propaganda that had previously defined German propaganda towards the East.  As 
Aristotle Kallis notes in “Nazi Propaganda and the Second World War,” Goebbels 








even if deliberately toned down -- seemed to resurrect the illusion of a “short war” 
that was nearing its successful conclusion (similar to the situation that came about in 
October 1941).119  Goebbels’ concerns were noted at an RMVP conference that took 
place on August 15: 
The Minister raises the subject of the powerful mood of optimism in the Reich 
and in particular refers to various reports by the SD and the Gauleiters which 
all agree in pointing out that the German people are full of hope of an early 
end to the war.  Even the smallest news items in the press or on the radio serve 
to strengthen that belief and to make it into a certainty for many people.  The 
Minister says he has done nothing to nourish such optimism and that he 
regards it as extremely dangerous.120 
 
For the Soviets, the reality was that the situation in the southern sector of the 
front had become increasingly desperate.  This was reflected in Stalin’s infamous 
“Secret Order No. 227” as well as in the tone of radio broadcasts and Pravda articles.  
Stalin’s secret directive, otherwise known as the “not one step back order,” stated 
that:  “No one commander has the right to retreat without an order.  Anyone who does 
so (will) be subject to immediate military tribunal” (which really meant and was 
understood to mean “shot”).121   
On the 20th of July 1942, Pravda published an article entitled “The Whole 
Might of Artillery Fire Against Enemy Tanks,” that aptly conveyed the desperation of 
the Soviet situation: 
It is a month since fierce battles are being waged on the steppes of the 
southern Soviet Union.  Despite huge losses, the enemy is pressing forward.  
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In a number of sectors, the situation is extremely tense.  Concentrating big 
forces and launching strong counter attacks, the enemy is seeking to reach the 
Volga as quickly as possible.  The problem of stopping the enemy must be 
solved and the hordes must be routed.122 
 
All the while, Army Group A was advancing at lightning speed toward the 
Caucasus, meeting only scattered Soviet resistance.  During the German advance 
southeast throughout the late summer of 1942, the Nazis and the Soviets waged a 
propaganda battle for the hearts and minds of the Caucasian peoples.   
The Foreign Broadcast Information Service’s London branch intercepted the 
following radio broadcast on its teletype, purported to be transmitted by a group that 
identified itself as the “Militant Union of Russian Nationalists” in Russian on August 
22, 1942: 
In the southeast, the Germans are advancing towards the Grozny oil area.  
Last night, German advance units were sighted in the outskirts of 
Ordzhonidze.  According to information just received, the German military 
flag is flying on summit of the Elbruz.123 
 
It is highly probable that the “Militant Union of Russian Nationalists,” was a 
group of ethnic Caucasian collaborators organized by the Germans that had either 
been parachuted into the Caucasus ahead of Army Group A’s advance or had made 
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contact with German special forces.124  No anti-Soviet partisans in this highly isolated 
and tribal region had the ability to make radio broadcasts that could be picked up in 
London without German assistance.  Nevertheless, the radio report was largely 
factual, as German troops had indeed reached the top of Mount Elbruz on August 12, 
1942, and were fast advancing towards Grozny and its expansive oil fields.   
On August 22, Moscow also made a broadcast directed to the Caucasian 
peoples, urging them to “remain” loyal to the Soviet cause in light of the rapid 
German advance.  Essentially ignoring the long and fractured history between the 
peoples of the Caucasus and Russian regimes from 1850 onward, Radio Moscow 
made an urgent appeal stressing the unity and equality of all Soviet peoples and 
praising the Caucasian’s heroic deeds thus far in the war: 
The history of the Caucasian peoples is full of examples of Azerbaidjanians, 
Armenians, Georgians, and Dagestanis fighting hand in hand against foreign 
invaders courageously defending their homes, honor and liberty.  During (the) 
years (under) the Soviet regime and the Constitution of Stalin, the Republics 
of the Caucasus have blossomed forth with friendships (between) different 
peoples (and) the Caucasus became strong as steel. 
As soon as (the) Fascist bandits trod on Soviet soil, the sons of Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, Armenia and Dagestan joined the Red Army.  Many have covered 
their names with glory on the fields of the Ukraine and Belorussia and near 
Moscow and Leningrad.  (Here the Soviets directly address German efforts to 
win over the Caucasian peoples.)  The enemy, counting on spreading quarrels 
amongst (different) peoples of the USSR have been badly mistaken.  (The) 
sons of the Caucasus are the same as their brother Belorussians, Ukrainians, 
Russians and Uzbeks and only have one aim, to destroy the invaders. 
For (the) Hitlerites, the Caucasus mean petrol.  They are striving to seize the 
black gold to enslave the whole world.  These fascist plans are doomed to 
failure. 
Together, with all the Great Russian people, led by Comrade Stalin, the 
Caucasians will cut off the grabbing paws of Hitlerites following old 
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traditions. (The) peoples of Azerbaijan, as well as all people of Transcaucasia 
will fight to complete victory. 
Representatives, petrol workers, engineers, poets, and collective farmers will 
tell at today’s meeting how they are fighting for petrol and increasing daily 
output of munitions, how heroically, they (are) helping the front by giving 
more and more agricultural produce.  (Everyone) is straining all their forces in 
order to throw back (and) destroy the enemy who (are) making an attempt to 
enslave all that is most precious to mankind: honor and liberty.125 
 
In this time of great anxiety for the Soviet Union, the theme of a United 
Russia quickly took precedence amongst Soviet propagandists in light of the myriad 
different nationalities that resided in the southern sector of the front.  The equality 
and fraternity of all Russian peoples was paramount in the above message to the 
peoples of the Caucasus. Completely absent from the broadcast were mentions of 
party or ideology.  There was one single mention of Stalin but it was made strictly in 
the context of being a benevolent friend and brother to the peoples of the Caucasus.  
It is also interesting to note that by this time in the war, both the Soviet’s and the 
German’s were respectively using the themes of United Russia and United Europe.  It 
was clear to both sides that they needed to mobilize as many people as possible, racial 
and ideological purity was not as major of a factor for either side than it once was.126  
By August 23, the German Sixth Army and their Hungarian, Italian, and 
Romanian allies had largely crossed the Don and had eliminated all Soviet resistance 
in the area, essentially leaving open the door to Stalingrad.  By this time, the Germans 
had also been able to establish forward air bases only 60 km’s from the city allowing 
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for a massive Luftwaffe bombardment that night which left over 40,000 civilians 
dead and turned the once sprawling industrial and cultural center into a smoldering, 
charred mass of metal, earth, and human remains.127  
Following the air attack on the night of the 23rd, Army Group B launched an 
offensive designed to quickly encircle the two Soviet Armies standing between Axis 
lines and Stalingrad (the 62nd and 64th).  Fourth Panzer moved north toward the city, 
while the Sixth Army moved south.  Despite a successful offensive conducted by 
Fourth Panzer on August 29, the Sixth Army was unable to snap the ring of armor 
surrounding Stalingrad’s western suburbs shut owing to a strong Soviet counterattack.  
This allowed the bulk of the Russian troops to withdraw to the city of Stalingrad.   
The Fourth Panzer Army finally linked up with the Sixth Army on September 
3 and the first German troops entered the city limits on September 13, marking the 
beginning of the battle whose name would eventually be heard the world over, 
Stalingrad.128  In reality, although German forces had not officially entered the city 
until the 13th, extremely strong Luftwaffe formations (essentially the entirety of 
Luftlotte 4) completely dominated the air over Stalingrad and by September 1 the 
Soviets could only reinforce the city of Stalingrad by ferrying men and supplies from 
the east bank of the River Volga.  German planes attacked anything moving across 








losses were of no significance for Soviet commanders who were instructed to hold the 







Stalingrad and the Crisis in the RMVP 
 
Prior to the “beginning” of the battle, the German high command quickly 
realized that the city of Stalingrad would be defended far more tenaciously than any 
of the towns that Army Group B captured on the Russian steppe during the previous 
summer’s offensive.  Instead of continuing their disorganized retreat further into the 
Russian steppe, German intelligence indicated that General Vassily Chuikov’s 62nd 
Army was not only preparing to defend the city, but was receiving significant 
reinforcements.130  
In anticipation of a potentially ferocious battle and in an attempt to avoid 
repeating the propaganda debacle of October 8, 1941, the RMVP issued an urgent 
request to the German press to refrain from writing or mentioning anything regarding 
the “forthcoming fall” of Stalingrad.  RMVP instead urged the press to refer to the 
fight as “the beginning of a major battle.”  Nevertheless, as indicated by Kallis, 
triumphalist propaganda “came from other sources that Goebbels was still incapable 
of controlling” (mainly Press Chief Otto Dietrich, whose daily conferences with 
Hitler indicated how much clout he actually had within the vast Nazi bureaucracy).131   
On the third of September, Otto Dietrich ordered newspaper editors to report 
on the “enormous economic and cultural importance of Stalingrad as a military-
industrial center and as a Communist citadel,” in an attempt to boost German morale.  
On September 7, Radio Berlin announced to the world: 
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Operations in the fortified Stalingrad sector were described by German 
sources on Tuesday evening as taking their planned course.  On the whole, the 
Soviet’s power of resistance may be regarded as waning and Berlin-informed 
sources no longer believe the Soviets, despite their moving up strong reserves, 
will still be able to disturb German operations and thus delay them for any 
considerable part of time.132  
 
Although at this point in the battle, it did appear as though the far better 
equipped German forces would eventually prevail over the Soviets at Stalingrad, any 
definitive announcement at this stage in the battle that proclaimed victory was 
premature.  Repeated incidents of this nature severely damaged the credibility of the 
Nazi Press. Goebbels seemed to understand this and his position could not have been 
more at odds with that of Dietrich (and the Fuhrer).  On September 18, a mere three 
days after Dietrich had predicted the fall of Stalingrad within hours, Goebbels 
instructed his subordinates to divert attention from the Stalingrad battle, “the question 
about the fall of Stalingrad has been asked amongst the people for some time now, 
but military progress is not such that a final capture of the city can be expected as yet.  
For this reason other subjects will now be brought to the fore.” 
Similarly, on the 22nd of September, OKW sharply rebuked the German press 
for “creating the illusion that the capture of Stalingrad is imminent.”133  Regardless, it 
was clear that Hitler sided with Dietrich’s approach at this point.   In his September 
30 address marking the opening of the Winter Relief campaign, Hitler said “the 
occupation of Stalingrad, which will also be carried through, will deepen this gigantic 
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victory and strengthen it, and you will be sure that no human being will drive us out 
of this place later on.”134 
In contrast to the bombastic proclamations and unfulfilled pledges broadcast 
over German radio, Soviet propagandists saw the battle of Stalingrad in far starker 
and more pragmatic terms.  To prepare the Russian populace for a potentially 
catastrophic battle at Stalingrad, Radio Moscow did not mince words, reporting on 
the 27th of August, 1942: 
In the south, the enemy is headed for the Volga and into the depths of the 
Caucasus Range.  History has perhaps never known such a gigantic battle.  
Huge masses of men are engaged in it with masses of tanks, planes and 
artillery.  Red Army units are selflessly holding against the pressure of the 
enemy.135 
 
The cautious optimism of the Soviets would soon prove to be the more 
prudent  
propaganda approach.  In October, bitter house to house (and factory to factory) 
fighting took place as the Soviets began to neutralize German air power by 
positioning their infantry as close as possible to the German attackers making it 
nearly impossible for German pilots to detect friend or foe.136   
The only Germans that received somewhat accurate portrayals of battles were 
the troops fighting on the eastern front who were already keenly aware of the ferocity 
of the fighting.  On October 12, 1942, a broadcast was read by a member of the 
Propagandatruppen as a tribute to the “unnamed” German infantry soldier whose job 
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was just as vital as it was thankless.137  This particular broadcast provided a detailed 
account of the fighting that Army Group A was experiencing on its drive toward the 
Black Sea and covered an intense battle fought for the Soviet town of Terek (a town 
that Hitler would coincidentally cite during his November 8 speech as evidence of the 
vast territories seized during the summer military offensive), located in the north 
Caucasus mountains on the approach to the oil fields of Grozny.  It was transmitted 
from Warsaw’s Radio Vistula on October 12, 1942, in German to the troops of the 
Eastern Front in a program known as “Front Reports”: 
In a rapid push forward yesterday, we advanced still further in two combat 
groups and here we encountered the first tenacious resistance.  Forest terrain 
(areas hard to overlook) offered excellent possibilities to the enemy to seek 
cover and camouflage.  An armored train had arrived on the railroad line and 
attacked our advance with violent shooting.  Pioneers (sappers I believe would 
be the correct translation) were put to combat.  The armored train was shot to 
pieces by our tanks during the evening hours.  But the attack continued to 
advance only with difficulties.  The enemy defended himself tenaciously and 
desperately.  In the unsurveyable (sic) forest terrain our tanks had no fighting 
possibilities.  The enemy set in brushwood and threw concentric charges at 
our tanks.  That was work for our infantry.  With machine guns and hand 
grenades the forest was combed and when night fell, our infantrymen stood at 
the outskirts of town.  There the bridge over the Terek blew up into the air 
with a terrific explosion, the Bolsheviks had blasted the bridge without 
consideration for the strong (Soviet force that lay on the other side of the 
river).  They had but one choice: to surrender or die.  During the night we 
settled down.  We dug holes into the ground and waited for the morning.  And 
morning came and now it is time!  Today, in the early morning hours, we took 
positions for the concentrated attack and everywhere, even in the streets of the 
town, a bitter battle, inhumanly hard, lasted for hours.  The Soviets throw their 
hand grenades under our feet, they shoot from behind walls, from gardens, 
from trees, machine gun fire scurging (sic) through the streets, it is a fight of 
man against man.  With these same weapons we break every resistance.  Our 
motorcycle riflemen are iron-hard.  Street after street is being fought free, 
each house must be cleaned up individually and now we have reached the 
center of the town. 
The fight in the heavily damaged town continued without interruption.  The 







our great victories has been fighting for weeks.  His weapons, the hand 
grenades and the rifle, decide the possession of streets and houses, breaking 
into the barricades in the fortified field systems, extensive in depth and with 
many lines in the terrain in front of town, these are his deeds, decisive in 
battle.   
The airforce (softens up the enemy) but conquering and occupying is the last 
task of each individual fighter of the infantry.  We see them here in front of 
us, these men, unshaven, not washed, rifles clasped tightly, hand grenades in 
the boot legs…138 
 
In Stalingrad, with superior numbers and firepower, the Germans had forced 
Chuikov’s 62nd Army into a 1,000-yard strip of land on the western bank of the Volga 
by early November.  On November 8, Hitler felt confident enough to announce to the 
world that the Battle of Stalingrad was as good as won: 
Now I do not always do things just as the others want them done.  I consider 
what the others probably believe, and then do the opposite on principle. So if 
Mr. Stalin expected that we would attack in the center, I did not want to attack 
in the center, not only because Mr. Stalin probably believed I would, but 
because I didn’t care about it any more at all. But I wanted to come to the 
Volga, to a definite place, to a definite city.  It accidentally bears the name of 
Stalin himself, but do not think that I went after it on that account.  
Indeed, it could have an altogether different name.  But only because it is an 
important point, that is, there 30 million tons of traffic can be cut off, 
including about 9 million of oil shipments.  There all the wheat pours in from 
those enormous territories of the Ukraine, of the Kuban territory, then to be 
transported to the North. There the manganese ore was forwarded.  A gigantic 
terminal was there; I wanted to take it.  And do you know, we’re modest: that 
is, we have it; there are only a couple of very small places left there.  
Now the others say: Why aren’t you fighting there?  Because I don’t want to 
make a second Verdun but would rather do it with very small shock units.  
Time plays no part here.  No ships come up the Volga any more-that is the 
decisive thing.  They have also reproached us, asking why it took us so long at 
Sevastopol?  Because there, too, we did not want to cause an enormous mass 
murder.  Blood is flowing as it is—more than enough.  But Sevastopol fell 
into our hands, and the Crimea fell into our hands. We have reached goal after 
goal, stubbornly, persistently.  
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And if the enemy, on his part, makes preparations to attack, don’t think I want 
to forestall him there, but at the same moment we let him attack also.  Because 
then defense still is less expensive.  Then just let him attack; he’ll bleed to 
death that way, and thus far we have always taken care of the situation 
anyhow.  At any rate, the Russians are not at the Pyrenees or before Seville; 
that, you see, is the same distance as for us to be in Stalingrad today, or on the 
Terek, let us say; but we are there; that can really not be disputed.  That is a 
fact, after all.  
Naturally, when nothing else will do any more, they also say it’s a mistake.  
Then they suddenly turn around and say: ‘It is absolutely a mistake for the 
Germans to have gone to Kirkenes, or to have gone to Narvik, or now perhaps 
to Stalingrad—what do they expect to do in Stalingrad?  For Stalingrad is a 
capital mistake, a strategic mistake.’  We will just wait and see whether that 
was a strategic mistake.  
We see already from present indications whether it was such a great mistake 
that we took possession of the Ukraine, that we-uh, took possession of the ore 
region of Krivoi Rog, that we got our hands on the manganese ores, or 
whether it was really such a great mistake that we got hold of the Kuban 
region, the greatest granary in the entire world, perhaps, whether it was a 
mistake that we, and I can safely say this, have now destroyed or got into our 
own possession four-fifths or five-sixths of all their refineries, that we alone 
either have right in our hands or have completely shut off, a production of 9 or 
10 million tons of oil, and we have further cut off the transportation of 
perhaps 7, 8 or 9 million tons over the Volga.139 
 
Declaring that “we are modest, that is we have the city (Stalingrad), there are 
only a few pockets (of resistance left),” Hitler once again showed his penchant for 
making premature statements that would come back to haunt him.  He displayed his 
inability to learn from past mistakes by declaring that “if the enemy wants to prepare 
an attack (on German forces at Stalingrad)…we let him attack because defense still is 
less expensive…he’ll bleed to death that way.”140  In this speech, he also identified 
his strategic reasoning for placing such paramount importance on capturing the city 
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that bore Stalin’s name, oil.  Interestingly, perhaps in light of the complete destruction 
of Soviet oil fields in the Caucasus, Hitler did not justify the German offensive in 
terms of securing oil for the Wehrmacht, but concluded that in preventing oil 
shipments from reaching Soviet troops and industry he would break the Red Army.  
Thus, he declared the Nazi effort successful owing to his belief that the actual capture 
of Stalingrad was not of great importance as German arms had already accomplished 
their goal of cutting off the 30 million tons of supplies (including between seven and 
ten million tons of oil) that would have been shipped north to the Soviet Union via the 
Volga.   
While Hitler was proclaiming victory at Stalingrad to the world and 
essentially daring the Soviets to attack -- on the other side of the Volga River -- 
Marshal Georgii Zhukov had been busy assembling a massive force consisting of 
over one million men and the latest in Soviet tanks, airplanes, rocket launchers, and 
heavy artillery.  Zhukov had organized this force into two separate pincers that met 
on November 22, 1942, and effectively surrounded the Sixth Army in Stalingrad, an 
army that was running desperately low on time and supplies.141  Hitler’s gamble had 
failed: there were scant reports referring to Stalingrad in the German press for nearly 
two months.142 
Erich Von Manstein made a futile attempt to rescue the besieged troops at 
Stalingrad by breaking through Soviet lines, but by January it was increasingly clear 
to all that the fate of the Sixth Army was all but sealed.  As Kallis notes “following a 
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lengthy meeting between Goebbels and Hitler on the 13th of January,” the topic of 
Stalingrad began to make its way back into German propaganda in the middle of 
January 1943.  Now, however, the troops were not described as invincible warriors 
marching east, but more as mythical heroes fighting for the great German homeland 
until their last bullet.143 
German radio prepared the troops encircled at Stalingrad for their new role as 
martyrs (and also used sentimentality in an effort to perhaps dissuade the soldiers 
from the thought of surrender) in a January 16, 1943, broadcast in German to the 
“German troops in the Stalingrad sector.”  The broadcast began ominously and stated, 
“there are situations in which one’s reason is at the end of its rope and sees no way 
out.  In such situations man performs deeds he never thought himself capable of 
performing.”  The broadcast continued: 
During the past winter, our fighter in the east has needed a stout heart and he 
has had it.  The infinite bravery and readiness of the soldiers on the Eastern 
Front to sacrifice themselves have given the German people intense strength.  
The Eastern campaign has opened the eyes of the German people to the 
enormous danger in which it stood.  But the bravery and splendid deeds of our 
fighters in the east have instilled in the German people the conviction that 
sooner or later we shall overcome this danger.  The homeland, therefore, has 
taken new courage.  It is determined to be worthy, to the last man, of our 
fighters in the East.  No man out there is alone.  The attention and hopes of 
their dear ones are focused on every single one of them. 
The homeland, by working constantly, is producing weapons, tools, clothes, 
and food so that, together with spiritual strength, unending supplies are 
pouring into the East.  Every fighter in the East must know this.  He must trust 
that one day this will have its effect upon him, too, however hard the present 
situation may appear to be.  The homeland will never forget you.  It thinks of 
you day and night and stretches out millions of hands to support you.  It 
knows how vital is your fight and your victory.  Without you and your 
bravery, the brown hordes would already be in our homeland and millions of 







Is there anything greater in the life of a man than to stand protectingly (sic) 
before those to whom nature has allotted the sacred task of erecting new life?  
Is there anything more beautiful than our soldier’s fight for the wellbeing of 
our people and for its youth?  In this spirit, the homeland greets you, as the 
nation’s guardians, with deep and infinite gratitude!144  
 
Following such a moving tribute to the encircled Sixth Army, which was 
losing over 1,000 dead per day in the month of January 1943, the following January 
29 broadcast, entitled “Goering Rewards Famous Chilean Diva,” in English to the 
world would seem to be in very poor taste (especially considering that Goering was 
the man who had guaranteed Hitler that his Luftwaffe would re-supply the encircled 
Sixth Army, a venture that failed catastrophically).  The broadcast read as follows: 
The Chilean singer, Rosita Serrano, does not even think of leaving 
Germany…German recognition of her many performances for the benefit of 
German soldiers was manifested anew by a gift from Reich Marshal Hermann 
Goering, who sent her a golden bracelet decorated by yellow amethysts, and 
who thanked her for the joy which she had brought to soldiers.  In addition, 
the Reich Marshal let her know that she was under his personal protection, 
and free to move about no matter how relations might be in the future between 
Chile and Germany.145 
 
Nonetheless, as far as the German populace knew, the Battle of Stalingrad 
came to a heroic end.  As noted by Kallis, the official declaration that Stalingrad had 
been lost came on February 3, 1943.  Prior to reading the declaration, the German 
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radio played the sounds of Beethoven’s “Heroica” symphony.146  The regime’s 
instructions to newspaper and magazine editors read: 
The heroic battle at Stalingrad has reached its end.  This moving event, which 
casts even the greatest heroic military deeds of the past into the shadows, must 
be presented to magazines as an example of the highest heroism and complete 
willingness to sacrifice for the victory of the German people.  The word 
Stalingrad must become a holy symbol for the German people.  The immortal 
heroism of the men at Stalingrad will unleash even more than before the spirit 
and strength of the German nation, which will ensure the victory it is now 













Following what could only be described as a total military and propaganda 
failure at Stalingrad, the RMVP found itself “increasingly in conditions of 
psychological competition against enemy broadcasts and leaflets, rumors, individual 
testimonies from soldiers, who had first-hand accounts of the fighting both in North 
Africa and the Soviet Union.”148  
As noted by Peter Longerich, Goebbels attempted to use the difficult military 
situation to maximize his influence over the German propaganda apparatus.  As early 
as the Winter of 1941/1942, Goebbels had warned against “unrealistic optimism,” and 
felt that Dietrich had once again been overzealous during the Stalingrad campaign, 
leaving him politically vulnerable.149  Goebbels tried to persuade Hitler to not only 
adopt a more “realistic approach” to German propaganda, but to transform the 
civilian sector onto a “Total War” footing.  Hitler reluctantly agreed and on January 
13, 1943, signed a decree for “the deployment of men and women for the tasks of the 
Reich Defense,” that forced the arms industry to send its youngest workers to the 
Wehrmacht.  The losses in the arms industry were made up by “exploiting” the 
remaining work force reserves including women.150   
Hitler appointed a “Tripartite Commission,” to implement these new measures  









Goebbels’ chagrin.151  Goebbels’ requests were largely ignored by the Commission as 
were his attempts to join it.  In order to circumvent the Commission he took his case 
to the German nation in a dramatic speech at the “Sportspalast,” to the German nation 
and for the first time used the phrase “total war,” in an attempt to “put the pressure of 
public opinion on his opponents” (Lammers, Keitel, and Bormann).  According to 
Longerich, the speech was considered a great propaganda feat, but it still did not 
translate into any actual concrete action, and when the eastern front stabilized in 
March of 1943, Goebbels efforts “fell apart.”152  While it is true that Goebbels may 
not have had any concrete success moving towards total mobilization within the 
Reich until the summer of 1944, he still pushed his program of “realism” and “total 
war” from late 1942 onward in the area of the Nazi bureaucracy where he still 
retained influence, the RMVP.  A new sense of “realism,” particularly as regarded the 
Axis military situation and the idea of a United European civilization mobilized 
against the Bolshivik hordes increasingly defined German radio broadcasts.153  
Around this time, Himmler’s S.S. and the Wehrmacht began actively courting 
European and Russian volunteers for military, police, and administrative duty 
throughout occupied Europe and even on the Eastern Front.154  Even as early as 
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the significance of a Bratislava radio broadcast in German, titled “Nazis Recruit S.S. 
Troopers in Slovakia”: 
Until very recently membership in the Nazi S.S. organization was restricted to 
handpicked Nazis in the Reich.  The exigencies of the Russian campaign saw 
many of the black-clad troopers pressed into military service at the front, and 
their ranks were thinned out by the relentless Russian campaign.  In order to 
fill these depleted ranks and to implant the proper Nazi ‘Kultur’ among the 
servile satellites, rules for admission into the elite S.S. organization were 
relaxed to such a degree that new members can now be recruited in the 
occupied territories and satellite states.  The consent of the puppet 
governments to such recruiting is a mere formality. 
Recently, the Bratislava radio broadcast in German to the ‘Nazis’ in Slovakia 
the following announcement: “Attention!! Here is an important message to all 
male members of our national group, the Reichsfuehrer of the S.S. has given 
permission for Germans living in Slovakia to volunteer for the armed S.S.  
With competent authorities of the state having given their consent, medical 
examinations will now be carried out in all local groups of the German party 
in Slovakia.  Appropriate instructions will be issued by the leader of our 
ethnic group.”155 
 
By the Spring of 1943, nearly every other broadcast emanating from German 
or German-controlled radio mentioned the phrase “United Europe.”  News items 
regarding economic clearing agreements between German vassal states, opportunities 
for foreign workers in the Reich, and military recruiting of nationalities dominated 
the airwaves.  The discovery of mass graves containing Polish officers massacred by 
the Soviet secret police in 1940 near the town of Katyn in late March 1943 only 
intensified his campaign against the “Yid-Bolsheviks.”156 
A rather inconspicuous February 19, 1943, broadcast (not coincidentally the 
day after Goebbels’ “Total War” speech) from Berlin in English to the world 
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announced the supposedly dramatic shift in Nazi policy; the “benevolent” German 
authorities now allowed members of the “free European family of peoples” the 
“privilege” of volunteering to participate in the Axis war effort: 
Because the population of occupied eastern territories dreads nothing more 
than the return of Bolshevism, soon after the occupation of those territories by 
the Germans many persons reported to the German Armed Forces, asking to 
be permitted to take part in fighting the Bolsheviks. 
At first the German command was most reticent in granting such requests 
made by Estonians, Lithuanians, Bessarabians, West Ukrainians, White 
Russians and Russians.  Finally they decided to give a number of these 
volunteers an opportunity to take part in the battle for the protection of their 
home country.  The volunteer formations have proved excellent, especially in 
the heavy fighting this winter.   
They were given their own uniforms with their national colors.  Under their 
own commanders they were included as equals in the German Armies in the 
East.  A special formula was used by them in taking the oath of allegiance, 
which stated that they pledged themselves to fight for the liberation of their 
home country from the Bolshevists, and for safeguarding their cultural and 
economic development within the framework of the Free European family of 
peoples.  They are on an equal footing with German soldiers in pay, clothing 
and food.  Their religious customs are respected.157  The wounded are treated 
in German hospitals.  The mutilated, as well as war widows and orphans are 
looked after in the same manner as the Germans. 
Apart from the volunteer formations, there are also men willing to help 
(Hillfwigen).  They support the German Armed Forces in the East, driving 
carts in supply columns or joining the local police.  Both formations have a 
chance of living their own cultural lives.  They have papers in their own 
languages, they have theatres, dance their own folk dances and sing their own 
folk songs.158 
  
It was clearly no coincidence that the Germans changed their policy regarding  
racial purity in the Ostheer following a winter of catastrophic defeats at the frontline 
and a rapidly growing partisan movement in their rear that threatened lines of 
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communication and supply.  This left the Wehrmacht with a severe manpower 
shortage.  Regardless of the dichotomy between Nazi war aims and the actual content 
of Nazi radio broadcasts -- Goebbels understood the importance of mobilizing 
European economic and military resources -- if the Reich was to have any chance at 
winning the war.159 
Broadcasting from Warsaw in Russian to the Soviet Union on March, 26, 
1943, an announcer read the first speech given by ex-Soviet General Andrei Vlasov 
on German radio, head of the newly formed ‘Russian Committee for Liberation’ in 
which he assailed ‘Commissar domination of the Red Army and called upon the 
Russian people to “fight Bolshevism for a new Russia.”160  
For propaganda (and certainly not practical) purposes the Nazis exploited 
General Vlasov and the idea of a “Russian Liberation Army” until nearly the end of 
the war.  While Radio Berlin announced to Europe on May 2 that: 
The war on the Eastern Front will be decided in western Russia, it is in the 
west 
of her immense territories that Red Russia will be strangled.  Real Russian 
Armies are preparing to enter the struggle on the side of United Europe.  This 
United Europe, if it was to be defeated by Stalin’s Army, should have been 
last winter.161 
 
Similarly, Radio Berlin broadcast the following message on May 13 in a piece 
entitled “Vlasov Tours Liberated Territory”: 
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The Chairman of the Russian Liberation Committee, Lt. Gen Andrei 
Andreyivitch Vlasov, recently inspected troops of the Russian Liberation 
Army in the northern sector of the Eastern Front.  Among others, Vlasov 
attended tactical exercises of the artillery division of this Army.  
Subsequently, Vlasov visited liberated eastern regions and made several 
speeches before the population.  He was received with great enthusiasm 
everywhere.162 
  
Contrary to the claims of German propaganda, Vlasov’s “armies” -- which in 
reality consisted mainly of Soviet POW’s who “volunteered” for service rather than 
face almost certain death in open air POW or concentration camps -- were used 
almost exclusively for anti-Partisan operations throughout Europe.  Hitler expressed 
great skepticism about any “Russian Army” and was particularly suspicious of 
Vlasov himself.163  As a result, Russian volunteers were strictly forbidden from 
fighting on the Eastern Front, where most quickly deserted to the Red Army rather 
than fight their fellow countrymen in any case.  While the German military situation 
crumbled on all fronts, Himmler officially authorized Vlasov to raise a “Russian 
Liberation Army” (the ROA) under his command in September 1944.164 
Incidentally, an after action report from an OSS parachute mission involving 
German-American citizens and Wehrmacht deserters (who volunteered for 
clandestine missions across the continent) reported that the area between Maribor, 
Slovenia, and Frauenthal, Austria was “swarming with brutal Russian Cossacks 
associated with Vlasov who were sent there by the Germans to conduct anti-Partisan 
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operations,” in February of 1945.165  It was just north of this area (roughly north of 
Prague) that Vlasov and the First Division of the ROA fought their only battle against 
Soviet forces.  They quickly retreated in the face of overpowering firepower and 
eventually turned their guns against German SS troops defending Prague before 
reaching American lines in Tyrol.  Here, Vlasov was captured by Soviet troops while 
under the custody of the U.S. Army and was hung by the Soviets about a year later.166 
                                                        









In the last week of February 1943, the German Propagandatruppen’s 537th 
Regiment -- at the time stationed several of kilometers west of Smolensk -- 
telegraphed Berlin regarding a startling discovery made by their comrades in the 570th 
unit of the Wehrmacht’s secret field police embedded with Army Group Center.  
They appeared to have found the decomposed bodies of hundreds, if not thousands, of 
Polish officers.167  The 570th reported to Berlin that immediate and extensive 
exhumations at the site of the potential mass grave were impossible because of the 
deep ground frost.  Apparently, local inhabitants were also thoroughly interrogated by 
the field police and a certain Dr. Butzh of Breslau University who was a forensic 
scientist attached to Army Group Center.168 
Buhtz was firmly convinced that the 570th had indeed found a mass grave and 
he spent the rest of March preparing for the exhumation of corpses, their 
transportation, their autopsy, and their labeling while ensuring the objects found with 
them (the bodies) were not “compromised.” The Commander of Army Group Center 
ordered a thorough exhumation led by Dr. Butzh on March 29, 1943, which quickly 
led to the discovery of the bodies of thousands of Polish officers.  When the military 
delivered this information to Goebbels and the RMVP on April 1st or 2nd, Goebbels 
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was reported to have replied “das Gluck, das ihm zugefallen war, kaum glauben 
konnte,” or “I cannot believe that good luck that has befallen me!”169 
Two weeks later, on April 12, 1943, Radio Berlin reported the spectacular 
news that German troops had discovered the bodies of 10,000 Polish military officers 
who were massacred by the Soviets.  The first broadcast concerning the massacred 
Polish officers was entitled “OGPU Killed 10,000 Polish Officers” and was 
transmitted to North America in English by Robert Broese, a writer for Germany’s 
Transocean press agency from Smolensk: 
I am now in a position to give General Sikorsky, Chief of the Polish Émigré 
Government in London, definite assurance that he is waiting in vain for the 
return of 900,000 Polish soldiers interned by the Soviets after the break-down 
of Poland in 1939.  The question of what was to become of these soldiers, it 
will be recalled has resulted in serious divergences of opinion between the 
Polish ‘Government’ and Soviet authorities.   
I have just returned to Smolensk from a visit to the grave of the Polish officers 
corps, in the forest at the former Soviet workers recreation home of Kosegary, 
20 kilometers west from Smolensk.  According to a thorough investigation by 
German military authorities, no fewer than 10,000 Polish officers, that is, all 
Polish officers who fell into Soviet hands, had been liquidated by the OGPU 
by shots to the back of the neck during February and March, 1940. 
These were buried in a common grave like dead dogs, in the Kosegory woods.  
I will never forget the hour which I spent at this grave, when I saw horrors 
which can hardly be described.  As I write this report, the frightful stench of 
decaying bodies is still in my nostrils.  I saw half-decayed bodies of murdered 
Polish officers heaped up by the hundreds. 
The half-decayed bodies still clearly showed bullet marks in the nape of the 
neck from the OGPU executioners shots.  The hands of some of the murdered 
officers had been tied behind their backs.  All dead officers were fully 
uniformed and booted.  Some field flasks, bread-bags and other pieces of 
military equipment, as well as empty vodka bottles, which presumably 







internationally known professor of medicine, Buthz of Breslau that other 
bodies will be found in the nearby woods was confirmed.170 
 
There are several striking features about the initial German announcement 
regarding the discovery of mass graves at Katyn.  The announcer directly addresses 
the entire broadcast to General Sikorsky, who was then the head of the Polish 
government in exile.  This was a clear attempt to divide the Allies (England/America 
and the Soviet Union) by causing a rift between the Polish government in exile and 
the Soviets.  As Broese said, the disappearance of Polish enlisted men and officers 
during the Soviet occupation (between 1939-1941) was a matter of great contention 
between Sikorsky and the Poles in exile and the Kremlin.  The Poles had long 
suspected Stalin was not telling them the truth regarding the whereabouts of arrested 
members of the Polish Army and it was impossible for them to ignore the German 
report.171   
The style in which Broese’s report was written was unique for Nazi 
propaganda.  It was extremely vivid and contains many facts, as opposed to the more 
dull, ambiguous form that German propaganda most often took.  Details such as “the 
frightful stench of decaying bodies still in my nostrils” and “the half-decayed bodies 
(that) still clearly showed bullet marks in the nape of the neck from the OGPU 
executioners shots,” lent credibility to Broese’s report.   This was indicative of the 
overall intensified German effort to make a serious attempt to rally civilians around 
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the Nazi cause in the aftermath of Stalingrad.  On April 15th, broadcasting in English 
to North America and Europe, the Moscow radio carried a TASS (Soviet Press 
Agency) statement that claimed the Nazis, not the Soviets, were guilty of the mass 
shootings of Polish officers.  The Soviet Information Bureau released the following 
statement: 
In the past two or three days, Goebbels’ slanderers have been circulating vile 
fabrications alleging that in the spring of 1940, the Soviets effected mass 
shootings of Polish officers in the Smolensk area.  In launching this fresh 
monstrous fabrication the German scoundrels do not hesitate to use the most 
unscrupulous and base lies in an attempt to cover up these unparalleled crimes 
which, as has now become obvious, were committed by themselves. 
German-fascist reports leave no doubt whatsoever as to the tragic fate of the 
former Polish prisoners of war who, in 1941, were engaged in building 
operations in the areas west of Smolensk and who, together with many Soviet 
residents in the area, fell into the hands of the Germans after the retreat of the 
Soviet troops.  Beyond any doubt Goebbels slanderers are now trying to cover 
up their own sanguinary crimes.  In their clumsily made up lies about 
numerous graves allegedly discovered near Smolensk they mention the village 
of Gnezdovaya, but like true crooks, they omit the fact that it was precisely 
near this village that archeologists excavated the historic Gnezdovaya burial 
place.  The Hitlerite frauds resort to cruel forgery and juggling with facts 
when they circulate slanderous fabrications about Soviet atrocities allegedly 
perpetrated in the Spring of 1940.  Thus, they try to divert from themselves 
the responsibility for their own brutal crimes.172 
 
The Soviet denunciation of involvement in the massacre was accompanied by 
an increase in coverage of the extermination of the Jewish population in Europe.  As 
Karel Berkoff contended in “Total Annihilation of the Jews: The Holocaust in Soviet 
Media.”  Berkhoff argued that the increase in coverage of Jewish matters in the 
Soviet press was a direct attempt by Stalin to connect the Polish government in exile 
to anti-Semitism (as they were, according to Pravda) working in “collusion” with the 
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Germans.173  This would appear to be true -- during the month following the 
announcement of the discovery at Katyn -- more time was devoted on Soviet radio to 
the treatment of Jews than during any other time period in the war.   For example, on 
April 15, the FBIS picked up a Khabarovsk radio broadcast on the Soviet Home 
Service: 
Reports coming from Bulgaria tell of the growing resentment among wide 
circles of the Bulgarian population towards the inhumane treatment meted out 
to the Jewish population by the authorities in Macedonia. 
As has been reported before, the Bulgarian authorities are evacuating many 
Jews to Poland.  The Jewish male population is at hard labor within the 
country, building fortifications and roads while old men, women, and children 
are sent to Poland -- to certain death.  They are shipped in sealed freight cars 
and denied food and drink for days on end.  Neither are they given any 
medical aid.  This organized extermination of the Jews causes resentment 
among the Bulgarian people.  Various delegations, one of them including a 
Cabinet member, have protested this inhuman attitude toward the Jews.  
During a stormy session of the Bulgarian Parliament, 42 deputies demanded 
that the maltreatment of Jews be investigated.  This demand was rejected by 
the Government.  The resentment against the Hitlerite anti-Semitic measures 
taken by the Bulgarian government will continue to grow.174 
 
Following the simultaneous approaches by the Polish government in-exile and 
the German government to the Red Cross to investigate the graves at Katyn, the 
Soviet government formally broke off diplomatic relations with the Polish 
government in exile.175  While Goebbels and the Nazi propaganda apparatus 
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accomplished their goal of splitting ties between the Soviet government and the 
Polish émigrés in London, relations between the Soviet Union and Britain and 
America were not damaged to the point where the Allied military effort was affected.  
Nonetheless, the Katyn incident became the catalyst for a major new German 
propaganda offensive throughout Europe and the occupied Eastern territories based 
around the theme of a United European Front standing firm against the Jewish 





A United European Campaign 
 
Having been denied the opportunity to establish even nominally autonomous 
states during the Nazi occupation up to this point – strangely enough, following the 
Wehrmacht’s defeat at Stalingrad -- the peoples of Eastern Europe increasingly found 
themselves included in the new German conception of a “United Europe.”  Nazi 
propagandists also used social, political, ethnic and religious overtones in an attempt 
to convince the occupied population that the Germans were essentially the lesser of 
two evils. 
Just prior to the release of information regarding the infamous Katyn 
Massacre and during the ensuing uproar, German radio increased the amount of 
coverage devoted to the idea of a “United Europe” stretching from France to the 
Ukraine.  This followed Propaganda Minister, Joseph Goebbels proclamation in 
February 1943 during his “Total War” speech that the “ostvolker must be mobilized 
in order to win the war.”176 
Broadcasts announcing the formation and recruitment of national armies to 
serve alongside the Axis on the Eastern Front continued to be a dominant theme 
throughout the Spring and Summer of 1943.  On May 22, Berlin Radio (DNB) 
reported from Lvov in German that a new Galician S.S. division was being formed.  
This broadcast is especially interesting due to its high praise of the “European nature 







The formation of a Ukrainian volunteer unit to fight at the front, started at the 
instigation of the Ukrainian population of the General Government has been 
so enthusiastically received that within a fortnight a large number, exceeding 
all expectations has volunteered for this ‘Volunteer Legion Galicia,’ which is 
said to have the strength of a Rifle Division.177  The solemn ceremony 
inaugurating this Legion at the end of April in the Governor’s Palace at Lvov 
was attended by numerous representatives of the Ukrainian population, 
members of the General Government administration and representatives of the 
Armed Forces, the SS, the Police and the Party.  Then Dr. Waechter, the 
Governor, pointed out the European character of the Galician area, on whose 
fields, thanks to the efforts of the Reich, the gigantic mass onslaught from the 
East had been beaten back in 1941, as so often in history.  A message from the 
Governor General stated that through this active fight against Bolshevism, the 
Ukrainian population of Galicia was securing for itself the blessings of 
European culture.  Dr. Kubiyovich, Head of the Ukrainian Chief Committee, 
affirmed in his vote of thanks that the fundamental attitude of Ukrainians 
sprang from their European attitude.  They were determined to do everything 
in their power to help in this great effort for the New Order in Europe…178 
 
Continuing the theme of foreign military collaboration, on the 24th, Berlin 
Radio broadcast in German to Europe that: “(Albanian) Premier Libohava announced 
the formation of purely Albanian Armed Forces intended for the defense of Albania 
in conjunction with Forces of Italy against enemy attacks.”179 
On the 26th, broadcasting in German to the world, Berlin reported from 
Bucharest: 
 
In the areas of Rumania inhabited by Germans, in Transylvania, Banat, and in 
the mountains, male members of the German national group are at present 
joining up for enrollment in the Waffen S.S. at the Kronstadt station.  The first 
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transport of S.S. recruits was dispatched to the Eastern front or for service 
within the framework of the Rumanian Army.180 
The very next broadcast emanating from Germany that FBIS picked up on the 
26th 
was entitled “Walloon Legion Expanded to Brigade” and was broadcast from Berlin 
to the Reich in German: 
Since the autumn of 1941, the Walloon Legion has proved its outstanding 
valor in severe fighting against Bolshevism at the Eastern Front, and month 
after month volunteers have flocked to its colors in very considerable 
numbers.  The Legion is now being extended to form a brigade which will be 
called the S.S. Volunteer Brigade Wallonia.181  
 
And on July 9, the FBIS even picked up a Berlin broadcast titled “Georgian 
Unit Sent to Atlantic Wall” announcing the first deployment of “native volunteers 
from the east”: 
It is learned that a unit of native volunteers from the East has been sent, for 
the first time, to the Atlantic Wall.  They are a Georgian infantry unit whose 
members have proved their mettle in fighting at the Eastern front and against 
Bolshevik gangs (partisans) in the rear.  Many of them are wearing the green 
ribbon decoration for gallantry.182 
 
It is interesting to compare the upbeat and heroic sounding recruitment 
broadcasts in Eastern Europe with the comparatively mocking, frustrated tone of 
similar appeals in Western Europe.  In a call for volunteers for the Norwegian Panzer 
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Grenadier Regiment (otherwise known as the Wiking S.S.), the commentator declared 
on the Tromsee radio on April 12, 1943, at 1:15 p.m. EWT that “Europe will have to 
make a total contribution”: 
We make an appeal to young Norwegians to join the Grenadier Regiment.  
They have an ideological task to perform, not only to defend Norwegian 
freedom against the Bolshevik menace, but also to defend Europe.  In the 
beginning of the struggle the Norwegian contribution had only a symbolic 
character.  There were very few Norwegians who realized the inner meaning 
of this world-wide battle and had the courage to offer their lives for their 
beliefs.  The great majority of the Norwegian people remained indifferent and 
preferred to keep aloof. 
‘The position now is, however, different.  The past winter has been a great 
strain on the European troops.183 The enemy’s assault is being made with 
tremendous masses of troops and at a great sacrifice of human material,’  It is 
no use concealing the fact that the situation is serious on the European front 
and that the future of the world is at stake.  Soldiers from Germany, Norway, 
Finland, Denmark, the Netherlands and Italy have so far managed to beat off 
the Bolshevik menace and the third year of the war on the Eastern Front is 
about to begin and we all have a feeling that it will be decisive. 
‘Europe will have to make a total contribution and our country (Norway) 
cannot avoid shouldering her share of the burden.  Norway will have to make 
her contribution to enable victory to be won.  We, therefore, appeal to all 
Norwegians to do their duty, to join the Panzer Grenadier Regiment and 
secure Norway’s future.’184  
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German Propaganda in Occupied Eastern Europe 
 
Following the German defeat at the Battle of Stalingrad, the National Socialist 
regime greatly expanded its propaganda efforts in the occupied Eastern European 
countries.  This coincided with the RMVP’s new theme of a United European 
Continent standing firm against the Jewish Bolshevism of the Soviet Union.  While 
German broadcasts, newspaper articles and posters increasingly exhorted the peoples 
of Eastern Europe to contribute as much as possible to the Axis war effort as the 
military fortunes of the Third Reich steadily declined, regional news outlets were 
generally used for utilitarian purposes and were largely devoid of the relatively 
‘positive’ messages that dominated Radio Berlin. 
The German propaganda apparatus in Eastern Europe significantly differed 
from that in the occupied Soviet Union as it was completely under the control of 
civilian authorities and the RMVP until the eastern front rapidly began to move 
westward in 1944 and the Wehrmacht once again asserted control.  Jan Grabowski 
chronicles the German propaganda apparatus in Poland in his article, “German Anti-
Jewish Propaganda in the Generalgouvernment, 1939-1945: Inciting Hate through 
Posters, Films, and Exhibitions.” 
Nazi propaganda in occupied Poland was directed by a branch of the General 
Government’s administration known as the Fachabteilung fur Volksauflarung und 
Propaganda (FAVup or Department of Education and Propaganda).  German 





Ministry in Berlin; while Grabowski contends that most of the other propagandists 
had been active in German media or the “liberal professions.”185 
Another important medium for propaganda throughout the occupied Eastern 
European countries was what the Polish referred to as the ‘yapper’ (a loudspeaker).  
Loudspeakers were strategically placed throughout public areas in Eastern Europe to 
provide the population with important information, much of which came in the form 
of warnings, curfews, and directives to civilian populations following German defeat 
at Stalingrad and the emergence of strong partisan movements in nearly every country 
under German occupation.186  Not surprisingly, Eastern European newspapers and 
radio broadcasts also contained incessant calls for foreign workers to come to the 
Reich, as well as frequent reports from foreign workers describing the high standards 
of living in Germany.  The already extensive use of anti-Semitic propaganda also 
increased, even though, as noted by Jeffery Herf, Jan Grabowski, Robert Herzstein, 
and Mikhail Tyaglyy, most Jews in Eastern Europe had already been annihilated.187 
In late 1942, the United States Office of War Information began publishing a 
top secret weekly analysis of foreign radio broadcasts in the occupied Eastern 
territories while the OSS began translating certain newspaper articles and radio 
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broadcasts emanating from Eastern Europe.  The OSS translated the following 
newspaper article entitled “The Life of Workers in Germany” that was published in 
the German controlled Serbian newspaper Novo Vreme on January 10, 1943: 
Mladen Babic, correspondent of Novo Vreme in Germany sent an article 
describing the pastimes of young Serbs working in Germany: Now in the 
fourth year of the war, in intimate contact with German realities, our young 
flock are capable of appreciating all the characteristics of the German people 
and in particular of their country life…We have had the opportunity of seeing 
with what interest our young people follow the work of the German farmers 
who, in their own way, endeavor to explain everything to these young 
Serbs…On Sunday mornings they often have lectures by German specialists 
which leave a profound impression upon our Serb lads…On Sunday evenings 
they meet in the cafés with their newly found friends and drink beer…188 
 
The OSS recorded a steady stream of articles from Novo Vreme that presented 
a favorable view of living conditions for foreign workers in the Reich.  On April 10, 
Novo Vreme reported: 
Everyday the number of our workers in Germany increases.  Some are placed 
in communal camps with Frenchmen, Dutchmen, and Belgians.  Others are in 
exclusively Serb camps.  The food everywhere is good.  Some of the workers 
when asked why they came, reply that it was to find work, others that the 
salaries were better here and others again because they enjoy more freedom 
and security here.189 
 
On April 18, Novo Vreme similarly reported on a visit by Serb “journalists” to 
Vienna.  The article stated that the newsmen were pleased to see the sincere 
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friendliness with which the Serb workers had been received in Germany.  The 
German nation, it concluded, was “imbued with social justice.”190 
“Social Justice” was most likely not the first term that came to the mind of 
most Serbs living under the German controlled puppet regime of General Neditch.  
Most broadcasts in Eastern Europe, especially following Stalingrad, had a negative 
tone that contrasted sharply with the flowery reports concerning the living conditions 
of foreign workers in Germany.  If one could read between the lines, the brutality of 
the German occupation was clearly revealed.  The FBIS picked up a broadcast 
emanating from Budapest on June 9, 1943, at 9:00 EWT entitled ‘Public Must Listen 
to Serbian Radio: 
The Serbian Minister of the Interior has issued an order, according to which, 
in all public places in Serbia, in cafes and restaurants, it is obligatory to play 
the radio for certain Serbian new broadcasts and other transmissions, such as 
speeches, public announcements, official statements, and warnings.  And it is 
obligatory for the public to listen to these programs.  The Serbian order 
prescribes that during these transmissions there has to be complete quiet and 
the guests should not be served.  Those who fail to comply with this order will 
be severely punished.191 
 
The use of radio for important announcements such as curfews and 
compulsory  
labor, military drafts and most ominously reprisals was by no means limited to Serbia 
or Yugoslavia.  Following the assassination of RSHA leader Reinhard Heydrich, the 
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Nazis unleashed a bloodbath of retribution in Prague and, according to the OWI’s 
analysis of the the pages of the German controlled Prague newspaper, Prague 
Neuetag, the Nazis did not hide their brutality from the Czech public.  During January 
of 1943, OWI concluded that: 
The Prague Neuetag recently reported that eleven Czechs were executed for 
treason and espionage on January 11 in Praha.  Among them was Frantisek 
Pavelka who was accused of sabotage.  On January 13th, eleven more Czechs 
were executed on charges of high treason, according to reports reaching the 
Office Of War Information.  Previously, the same paper had reported the 
execution of seven Czechs on January 8th.  They were charged with planning a 
revolutionary movement against Germany and the Protectorate.  Further 
reprisals against the ‘restless’ Czechs were announced in the January 17th 
edition of the newspaper, which reported the execution of four persons 
accused of possessing arms, and eight charged with ‘insulting conduct 
towards the Volksdeutsche.’192 
 
The Czech home radio also broadcast a speech made by the puppet Czech 
“Minister of Education in the Protectorate,” which was essentially a furious tirade 
against the people he was supposed to be serving.  It was analyzed by the OWI and 
provides a fascinating look into the relationship that the leaders of German puppet 
states had with their own population: 
Col. Emanuel Moravec, Minister of Education in the Protectorate, recently 
told his radio audience that as long as the enemy ‘recruits allies in Europe,’ 
the nations which stand for it will ‘suffer unhappy consequences.’  He urged 
that force be employed where kindness is of no avail. 
In his harungue, Col. Moravec lashed out at the widespread underground 
movement.  The Colonel showed special bitterness and hate towards the 
Czech intellectuals, who in his words, as the educated stratum ‘still contains 
circles of unreformable elements.’  Pitting the worker and the farmer against 
the intellectuals he boasted that ‘the position of the worker and farmer has 
improved, and that members of the intelligentsia, too, would be entitled to 
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better renumeration, if they were worthy.’  He stamped the educated class as 
‘lazy,’ because of its subtle methods to hinder protection for the Nazis.  In his 
bitter tirade against Czech officials (in exile) he was forced to admit the 
effectiveness of the sabotage practiced by them.  Moravec cried: ‘How can I 
ask you the Czech intelligentsia ask for equal pay with the German officials, 
when its average work amounts to half that of German officials! 
War is but a difficult test, along the way to lasting peace.  Nobody must 
therefore think that the present conditions are lasting, both as regards food 
policy and security measures by the Police.  So long as the enemy goes on 
trying to recruit allies for himself in Europe in the form of conspirators and 
terrorists, so long will it involve unhappy consequences for the nations in 
whose midst such gentry are found.’193 
 
Also of note during the January 29 OWI analysis of propaganda directed to 
Czech lands was a decree published in Der Neuetag on January 12, 1943, that 
“cancelled the legal status and constitution of the Czechoslovak Orthodox Church; 
the property of the Church was confiscated soon after Heydrich’s assassination.”  
This decree certainly did not square up with the Nazi claim that Germany was the 
“sole protector” of Christianity against the “Bolshevik hordes.”  Nor was it consistent 
with their propaganda further east and north in the Ukraine and the Baltics where the 
Germans claimed to be champions of religious tolerance.  
It also became clear that so called “volunteers” for foreign labor in the Reich 
or for police and anti-Partisan units in the occupied East were in reality being forced 
to work by Nazi authorities.  The U.S. Office of War Information analyzed a Prague 
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broadcast in Czech made during the week of May 12, 1943, that began “You are 
about to hear an important announcement!” which ordered:  
The ‘compulsory’ labor registration in the Protectorate of Bohemia and 
Moravia for men between the ages of 16 and 65 and women between the ages 
of 17 and 45 in accordance with the government order of May 4, 1943, on the 
mobilization and direction of labor power announced by the Minister for 
Labor and National Economy.  This order exempts women with two or more 
children below the age of 14 and women with at least one child under the age 
of six.  The order also excludes German military, political, and labor 
personnel; civil service workers, foreign consuls, their staffs and families; 
ministers of religion; persons in reformatory and criminal institutions and men 
and women in schools of ‘general education.’194 
 
On June 11, 1943, Budapest radio reporting from Belgrade announced in 
German: 
It is officially announced that all inhabitants of the town (Belgrade) born 
between 1903 and 1907 must register for public labor service.  Compulsory 
registration also applies to public officials.  Fit persons will be liable to one 
month’s service in the homeland.  Recalcitrant persons will be sent abroad.  If 
they evade the draft their relatives will be held as hostages.195 
 
German-controlled radio announced that if any inhabitant of Belgrade 
“evaded” the labor draft -- not only would they be sent abroad (to Germany) for 
compulsory labor service -- their relatives would also be held as hostages.  Clearly, 




194 OWI weekly report, May 12, 1943, Office of War information, Records of the Bureau of Overseas 
Intelligence, Research Reports, Records of the Office of War Information, NARA, College Park, MD, 
RG208, Entry #366, Boxes #219-223. 
194 Radio Budapest in German to Europe, June 11, 1943, Transcription of Foreign Broadcasts: 1941-









While ideology remained an important part of German radio broadcasts until 
the end of the Second World War, after the Winter Crisis of 1942/1943, Nazi 
broadcasts to the East became utilitarian in an effort to more effectively administer 
the occupied Eastern territories and to round up all available manpower in light of the 
increasingly difficult military situation on the Eastern Front.  While German 
propagandists clearly aimed to indoctrinate occupied populations over the long term, 
in the short term, Nazi radio broadcasts also reflected the need to effectively govern 
and administer the masses through labor and military mobilization, announcements 
regarding foreign labor, and various other decrees.  The fact that the Russian section 
was the largest in the German Foreign Ministry’s Department of Radio Policy and 
had the ability to transmit daily broadcasts in eleven different languages found in 
European Russia testifies to the importance the German regime placed on the new 
medium of radio broadcasting as a major part of “Operation Barbarossa.” 
Nazi radio broadcasts were aimed at the Soviet Union to convince civilians of 
the righteousness of the German cause through both ideological and pragmatic 
appeals.  German propagandists consistently presented Germany’s campaign against 
the Soviet Union as a war of “liberation” against Stalin’s brutal brand of Bolshevik 
rule.  As the military situation continually deteriorated for the German army on the 
Eastern Front following the defeat at Stalingrad, Nazi propagandists increasingly used 
radio broadcasts in an attempt to administer and mobilize the resources and 





German administration of the territories in the East severely undermined their 
propaganda efforts.  The massive scale of partisan activity in areas under Nazi control 
by 1944 reinforces the idea that the German radio campaign in the Soviet Union was 
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